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This Article argues that, in the aftermath of violent crime, a
relationship that is both negative and involuntary can form
between crime victims and offenders. This relationship fetters
the victim to the crime and the criminal, rendering it difficult to
recover from the transgression. To illustrate how such a
relationship may form and what consequences it may have for
victims, this Article uses the Oklahoma City bombing as a case
study, documenting through the use of original interviews an
involuntary relationship in which victims' family members and
survivors perceived they were tethered to Timothy McVeigh. This
perceived relationship with McVeigh aggravated family
members' and survivors' emotional and psychological wounds,
delaying their healing. The Article further argues that this
relationship originated in media coverage of McVeigh that
portrayed him as defiant, remorseless, and unemotional, and
that the relationship was further developed at trial when family
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members and survivors were profoundly disturbed by McVeigh's
conduct. To minimize the harmful effects of victim-offender
relationships, this Article proposes that victim services workers
educate victims about the possibility of such a relationship, help
victims cope with media coverage of the defendant, and assist
victims in understanding defendants' behavior during trial.
Finally, it recommends that opportunities for voluntary victim-
offender mediation be made available to help mitigate the
negative consequences of these victim-offender ties.
I. INTRODUCTION
"It's over. We don't have to continue with him any more."
-- Janice Smith, Family Member of
Oklahoma City Bombing Victim1
On April 19, 1995, thousands of pounds of fuel oil and
fertilizer brought down the nine-story Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building. A total of 842 persons were injured or killed as a direct
result of this tragedy; 168 of the 842 were killed, 19 of whom
were children. The blast left 462 homeless and damaged 312
buildings and businesses.2 In the weeks and months following the
bombing, several reconstructive groups emerged and became
extraordinarily active, serving as magnets for community
membership and resources. Formative among them were the
Oklahoma City National Memorial Task Force, charged with
overseeing the building of the Oklahoma City National Memorial,
and a group comprised of family members and survivors seeking
to shorten the lengthy habeas appeals process so as to bring a
swifter peace to the survivors and victims' families.3 In
subsequent trials, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols were
indicted and charged with eight counts of first-degree murder for
the deaths of federal officials, as well as three other charges,
including conspiracy.4 While McVeigh was convicted in June 1997
1. Nick Bryant, Pain Remains for McVeigh Victims, BBC, June 11, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/1383171.stm. Janice Smith's brother died in the
bombing. She made this remark after learning of McVeigh's execution. Id.
2. Karen A. Sitterle & Robin H. Gurwitch, The Terrorist Bombing in Oklahoma
City, in WHEN A COMMUNITY WEEPS: CASE STUDIES IN GROUP SURVIVORSHIP 161, 161,
163-64 (Ellen S. Zinner & Mary Beth Williams eds., 1999).
3. See, e.g., OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RESPONDING TO
TERRORISM VICTIMS: OKLAHOMA CITY AND BEYOND 4 (2000), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/pdftxtINCJ183949.pdf; Mission Statement, Oklahoma City
Memorial Foundation, http://www.oklahomacitynationalmemorial.org/secondary.php?
section=10&catid=195 (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
4. George Lane, Federal Charges, DENV. POST, Mar. 30, 1997, at D-06; List of
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on all counts and sentenced to death,5 the jury in Nichols's trial
found him guilty of involuntary manslaughter and conspiracy
after deliberating for approximately forty hours, failing to reach
a unanimous verdict on whether Nichols planned the bombing
with the intent to kill.' After he was sentenced to life in prison
without possibility of parole, Nichols was tried and convicted in
2004 of 162 counts of first-degree murder in Oklahoma state
court, but again escaped the death penalty.7
The legal aftermath of the Oklahoma City Bombing
culminated in the execution of Timothy McVeigh. On June 12,
2001, 242 witnesses-ten in the death house at the state
penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana and 232 at a remote
viewing location in Oklahoma City-prepared for an event they
all hoped would bring some ending to an unspeakable period in
their lives.8 Whereas "live" witnesses viewed a side profile of
McVeigh, "remote" witnesses observed the closed-circuit feed
from a camera positioned on the ceiling directly over McVeigh's
face.9 Although Attorney General John Ashcroft's remarks on
McVeigh's execution emphasized "closure," ° most witnesses
found some element of the event disappointing. Sue Ashford, a
survivor who witnessed the execution via closed-circuit
transmission, stated, "The man just went to sleep."" Paul Howell,
another witness, lamented, "We didn't get anything from his face.
His facial expressions were just about as calm as they could be."2
Larry Whicher said that "it [didn't] really provide as much as I
thought it would."3
Dramatic and tragic deaths are cultural traumas that
require explanation. In their wake, understandings are formed
collectively through such processes as interpersonal discussion
and media coverage. In the context of the Oklahoma City
Charges Against McVeigh, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 31, 1997, at 14.
5. Jo Thomas, McVeigh Jury Decides on Sentence of Death in Oklahoma Bombing,
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1997, at Al.
6. Lynda Gorov, Nichols Convicted in Plot but Acquitted of Murder, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 24, 1997, at Al.
7. Arnold Hamilton, Oklahoma Jury Deadlock Spares Nichols the Death Penalty,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 12, 2004, at 4A.
8. See Jim Yardley, Execution on TV Brings Little Solace, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,
2001, at A26.
9. Id.
10. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Ashcroft's Statement
Regarding the Execution of Timothy McVeigh (Apr. 12, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/April]169ag.htm.
11. Lois Romano, McVeigh Is Executed, WASH. POST, June 12, 2001, at Al.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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bombing, memory of the bombing as a culturally traumatic event
was constructed through social processes, and ties formed out of
bloodshed that both helped and hindered family members' and
survivors' reconstructions of meaning. The rapport that
developed between members of prominent task-oriented
community groups formed in the aftermath of the bombing was a
key source of healing energy. These bonds were often felt to be as
strong as those of blood kinship. In addition, an involuntary
association between victims' families and survivors, on the one
hand, and perpetrators Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, on
the other, crystallized at 9:02 a.m. on April 19, 1995."4 Unlike the
voluntary relationships between members of community groups,
which were strengthening and constructive ties, this involuntary
victim-offender relationship was a destructive and confining tie
that trussed victims to the bombing. To study these
relationships, their construction, and their representative effects
is to step into a realm in which research has yet to shed light.
This Article is the first to propose that an involuntary
relationship forms between a victim and an offender after a crime
is committed. It develops the argument that such a relationship
exists and examines it through a case study of a perceived
relationship between victims' family members and survivors of
the Oklahoma City bombing and bomber Timothy McVeigh.
Here, the term "relationship" is used to denote a perceived quasi-
interpersonal bond, positive or negative, that forms between a
previously unacquainted victim" and offender after the
commission of a crime; it is not used as it is commonly
understood-to denote whether the victim and offender were
known to one another before the crime was committed. The use of
the term "relationship" captures the intimate ways in which a
victim's tie to an offender continually pervades her life,
potentially until the offender's release makes tracing impossible,
or until the offender is executed. Although future research will
document when and how the formation of such a tie forms in
crimes other than mass murder, it is logical that it is most likely
to form in the aftermath of violent crime, particularly offenses in
which the victim is most intimately or grievously affected. This
involuntary relationship is most harmful when offenders appear
14. See Rick Bragg, McVeigh Guilty on All Counts in the Oklahoma City Bombing;
Jury to Weigh Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1997, at Al (stating the tragedy at
Oklahoma City began when "a truck crammed with explosives went off at 9:02 A.M., April
19, 1995").
15. The Author uses the term "victim" so as to include victims' family members and
survivors as well.
2009]
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defiant, remorseless, and unemotional, as McVeigh was
perceived. Ironically, though this relationship is involuntary in
the sense that it is forced upon victims as a consequence of crime,
the quests for information and accountability that are part and
parcel of this bond are crucial to recovery and release from such a
tie.
16
The formation of such a relationship is the natural social
byproduct of the adversarial and open nature of our criminal
justice system, where media coverage is commonplace and
defendants' histories become part of the trials and public records.
This is particularly true in capital cases in which mitigating
evidence is introduced. Courtrooms are communicative as well as
adjudicative forums, after all, and a great deal is on display
besides the workings of justice. Victims will also track offenders'
progress through the criminal justice system; keeping apprised of
appeals and likely release dates prolongs this involuntary
relationship for years after conviction. An awareness of this
relationship's formation and effects is important not only because
the law plays such a fundamental role in its composition and
maintenance, but also because these involuntary ties may have
profound consequences for victims' ability to cope with and move
on from the crime.
In Part I, this Article engages the novel topic of involuntary
victim-offender relationships by summarizing current research
on two tangentially relevant issues: victim-offender mediation
and the courtroom as a theatrical or dramatic forum. In Part II,
this Article sets the stage for explaining the victim-offender
relationship in the context of the Oklahoma City bombing by
discussing the efficacy of a collective memory and cultural
trauma perspective for analyzing how victims make sense of
crimes and legal proceedings in the aftermath of mass violence.
In Part III, this Article will detail the involuntary relationship
that formed between McVeigh and family members and
survivors, a bond predicated on the basis of constructed social
and media representations of McVeigh. Thereafter, it will
examine how this involuntary relationship affected how victims'
families and survivors perceived McVeigh's behavior during his
trial and how these impressions affected their ability to
narratively assimilate the Oklahoma City bombing into their
16. "Victims who never meet their offenders, or never learn much about the
offenders' lives, may fear them as monsters. Victims who learn the life story, or at least
present circumstances, of their offenders may come to understand them better." Heather
Strang et al., Victim Evaluations of Face-to-Face Restorative Justice Conferences: A Quasi-
Experimental Analysis, 62 J. SOC. ISSUES 281, 285-86 (2006).
406 [46:2
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lives and to cope with its traumatic nature. Accordingly, this
Article concludes in Part IV by proposing not only that victim
services agencies are in the best position to educate victims on
the nature and effects of this relationship so as to mitigate
further trauma to the victim, but also that voluntary post-
conviction victim-offender mediation could assist in helping
victims cope with and eventually sever these involuntary ties to
the offender.
II. LAYING THE GROUND FOR RESEARCH
ON VICTIM-OFFENDER RELATIONSHIPS
No scholars have yet identified or analyzed contact between
the victim and offender as an involuntary relationship. In part,
this oversight likely stems from the dearth of qualitative
research on how violent crime affects victims and their family
members; evidence of concepts such as the victim-offender
relationship is unlikely to surface without studies in which
subjects may provide interviewers with clues to their existence. 7
Researchers have begun to address two tangentially relevant
subjects; however, the paucity of scholarship on these issues
suggests that they are also under-researched. First, academics
have examined the effects of interactions between victims and
offenders in post-sentencing victim-offender mediation, reporting
that prior to mediation, victims perceive that offenders exercise
control over them or become preoccupied with the offender."
Second, a few scholars have addressed the visibility of trial
participants' courtroom behaviors, but these scholars do not
consider the particular significance of defendants' conduct for
victims. 9 The former body of research is helpful in documenting
17. See Margaret Vandiver, The Death Penalty and the Families of Victims: An
Overview of Research Issues, in WOUNDS THAT Do NOT BIND: VICTIM-BASED
PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEATH PENALTY 235, 235 (James R. Acker & David R. Karp eds.,
2006) ("There is surprisingly little research concerning the effects of capital punishment
on the families of murder victims.... We know very little about how the death penalty in
practice affects victims' families."). Despite the fact that crime victims are not often
subjects in qualitative interviewing studies, there are a few studies to which interested
readers may be directed. See, e.g., PAUL ROCK, AFTER HOMICIDE: PRACTICAL AND
POLITICAL RESPONSES TO BEREAVEMENT 29 (1998) (discussing bereavement following
homicide based on interviews with victims' family members who joined victims' advocacy
groups); Mark S. Umbreit & Betty Vos, Homicide Survivors Meet the Offender Prior to
Execution: Restorative Justice Through Dialogue, 4 HOMICIDE STUD. 63, 67 (2000)
(interviewing victims' family members who attended mediation sessions with their
relatives' murderers).
18. Umbreit & Vos, supra note 17, at 66.
19. See Laurie L. Levenson, Courtroom Demeanor: The Theater of the Courtroom, 92
MINN. L. REV. 573, 582-83 (2008); see also KATHY LASTER, THE DRAMA OF THE
2009] 407
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the effects that offenders have upon victims, but it does not go far
enough in chronicling victims' anger and angst from the
immediate aftermath of the crime through sentencing and
beyond. The latter area of research is most applicable, but
focuses on the unorthodox effects defendants' behaviors might
have upon jury members while neglecting the particular issues at
stake for victims. For instance, in the most recent article to
address this issue, Levenson argues that the courtroom is a
"theater in which the various courtroom actors play out the guilt
or innocence of the defendant for the trier of fact to assess."2 ° In
this dramatic forum, she notes, "[T]he outcome of the case is
affected by many factors that are not technically evidence: the
quality of the lawyers' presentations, the appearance and
reaction of the defendant in the courtroom, and even the
presence of the victim's representatives."2' Levenson further
asserts that "[ljurors scrutinize [the defendant's] every move,
attaching deep importance to a quick glance or a passing
remark."22
This Part will first summarize research findings on victim-
offender mediation. It will then summarize scholarship and case
law on how jurors are potentially influenced by the courtroom
appearance and demeanor of defendants and spectators.
A. Research on Victim-Offender Mediation
Victim-offender mediation may help loosen the negative ties
that victims perceive bind them to offenders. Studying how
victims benefit from mediation provides a means of documenting
how victims are traumatized by crime and how they recover-
COURTROOM 2, 9-12 (2000) (discussing popular film depictions of courtroom drama and
arguing that the popularity of the genre is due in part to its examination of social issues
and institutions, as well as its purpose as a sort of morality play); Pnina Lahav, Theater
in the Courtroom: The Chicago Conspiracy Trial, 16 LAW & LITERATURE 381, 385-86
(2004) (situating the Chicago Conspiracy Trial in its historical context and exploring its
relevance to the jurisprudence of political trials and to theories of the theater); Daniel
Larner, Justice and Drama: Historical Ties and "Thick" Relationships, 22 LEGAL STUD. F.
3, 17 (1998) ("[Dlrama itself is a vital part of the tissue of experience that develops our
ideas and expectations of justice."). Many scholars have recognized that courtrooms are
dramatic forums and embody theatrical characteristics. See, e.g., MILNER S. BALL, LYING
DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY 133 (1985) ("Courtrooms are theaters.
A lawsuit is a theatrical event where legal argument is devoted to achieving an affecting,
just performance."); MILNER S. BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW: A THEOLOGICAL,
HUMANISTIC VIEW OF LEGAL PROCESS 42-51 (1981) (analyzing courtroom trials as a form
of "judicial theater," complete with "stage," audience, and dramatic format).
20. Levenson, supra note 19, at 573.
21. Id. at 574-75 (internal citations omitted).
22. Id. at 575 (citing HAZEL THORNTON, HUNG JURY: THE DIARY OF A MENENDEZ
JUROR 46-47 (1995)).
408 [46:2
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issues that in turn provide insight on the origins of that trauma.
The fact that these harms are reduced or disappear entirely upon
meeting an offender may mean that they are negative
consequences of the victim-offender relationship that are
mitigated by mediation. For instance, one study found that, after
mediation, victims felt as if the offender no longer exercised
control over them and that they ceased to be preoccupied with
the offender." Further research is necessary in order to precisely
identify what effects of crime persist until mediation or how
mediation alleviates these consequences.
Moreover, victim-offender mediation illuminates victims'
desire to terminate these ties to the offender through
interpersonal confrontation and communication-an opportunity
they are denied in the courtroom. According to Umbreit and Vos,
family members wished to pursue mediation with offenders on
death row because of a desire to communicate to the offender the
horrific nature of the impact of his crime and potentially hear
him take responsibility.24 Family members felt that this was
impossible to do in legal proceedings because such an
institutional setting "causes separation and disconnection where
there should be connection."25  All family members that
Umbreit and Vos interviewed "sought a personal, human
encounter" and stated that they wanted to see the defendant
face-to-face, to look the defendant in the eye." Family members
were also interested in "piecing together some kind of
explanation through obtaining information about the
[defendant's] life and history."27 After the mediation sessions
were concluded, family members "felt that the experience was
powerful and healing, and they were relieved and renewed," and
all family members found it very rewarding to hear the offender
express responsibility.28
B. The Defendant's Courtroom Appearance and Demeanor
The notion that the defendant's appearance affects trial
outcome is not new. In Estelle v. Williams, the Supreme Court
held that compelling a defendant to wear jail clothing at trial
violates the right to a fair trial because "the constant reminder of
23. Umbreit & Vos, supra note 17, at 66.
24. Id. at 70-71.
25. Id. at 70.
26. Id. at 71.
27. Id. at 77.
28. Id. at 78 (noting, as one family member put it, that "it was gratifying to hear it
out of his mouth and not out of a reporter's mouth").
2009] 409
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the accused's condition implicit in such distinctive, identifiable
attire may affect a juror's judgment."29 Likewise, in Illinois v.
Allen, the Supreme Court determined that a defendant may be
prejudiced if forced to appear before the jury shackled and
gagged because "the sight of shackles and gags might have a
significant effect on the jury's feelings about the defendant." °
Like a defendant's physical appearance, a defendant's
demeanor or conduct also can impact the outcome of legal
proceedings.3' Well-publicized examples of this phenomenon
abound. Joseph Hartzler, the lead prosecutor in the McVeigh trial,
explicitly drew jurors' attention to McVeigh's stoicism, reminding
them that "not a single witness testified at any other time that
Timothy McVeigh ever had a tear in his eye except when he was
concerned about his own welfare, except when he was concerned
and worried about his own death."2 Jurors in the Scott Peterson
trial stated that Peterson's lack of remorse contributed to his
conviction.33 Moussauoi's erratic courtroom rants engendered
much speculation as to his mental condition.34 Certain defendants
become infamous for their courtroom conduct. During his murder
trial, cult leader Charles Manson continuously "interrupted
proceedings by shouting, chanting, turning his back on the judge,
assuming a crucifixion pose, and singing."35 Newspapers recount
the blas6 attitude of less well-known defendants in great detail.36
29. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05 (1976).
30. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970).
31. For an excellent discussion of how defendant demeanor influences high-profile
trials, see Jerrold M. Post & Lara K. Panis, Tyranny on Trial: Personality and Courtroom
Conduct of Defendants Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
823 (2005); Michael P. Scharf, Chaos in the Courtroom: Controlling Disruptive Defendants
and Contumacious Counsel in War Crimes Trials, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 155 (2006).
32. Killer Maintains Icy Composure, Waves to Parents, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, June
14, 1997, at 1A (quoting Joseph Hartzler).
33. Diana Walsh & Stacy Finz, Peterson Jury: Death; The Jurors: How They
Decided He Should Die, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 14, 2004, at Al ("[Tihe cumulative weight of
Peterson's deceptions and even his courtroom demeanor worked against him."). The
article quoted one juror as stating that "there was no emotion, no anything.... That
spoke volumes." Id.
34. See, e.g., Greg Gordon, Moussaoui Theatrics Continue as Jury Selection Begins,
STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Feb. 7, 2006, at 4A; John Riley, Moussaoui Defiant in
Courtroom, NEWSDAY, Feb. 7, 2006, at A05 (detailing one of Moussaoui's outbursts and
noting that "[tihe behavior echoed his conduct during pre-trial hearings since 2001, where
he has regularly railed against his lawyers and declared his hostility toward America,
leading to questions about his mental competency"); Neil A. Lewis, Judge Ejects 9/11
Suspect After Outburst, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2006, at A20 (stating Moussaoui repeatedly
accused his lawyers of "conspiring with the judge and the prosecution to execute him").
35. Robert Dardenne, The Case of Charles Manson, in THE PRESS ON TRIAL: CRIMES
AND TRIALS AS MEDIA EVENTS 159, 167 (Lloyd Chiasson, Jr. ed., 1997).
36. See, e.g., Michael Brick, Facing Death Penalty, "Rated R" Betrays No Emotion,
410 [46:2
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Empirical research based on interviews with capital jurors
has shown that jurors are more likely to impose the death
sentence when the defendant appears bored or emotionally
uninvolved, but more likely to favor a life sentence when the
defendant appears sorry and sincere.37 In addition, capital jurors
generally disapproved when defendants testified during the
punishment phase, perceiving that the defendant was lying,
displayed no remorse for the crime or murder victim, displayed
no emotion while on the stand, or appeared arrogant or
insincere.38 Furthermore, in death penalty cases in which capital
jurors commented that the defendant's testimony lacked remorse
or sorrow, the defendant was sentenced to death; conversely, in
death penalty cases in which all capital jurors commented that a
defendant seemed likeable and a majority of jurors stated that
the defendant sounded remorseful, the defendant was sentenced
to life.39 These studies bolster the conclusion of scholars such as
Levenson, who recognize that the "defendant's demeanor off the
stand" may affect case outcomes.4 Jurors therefore use a
defendant's conduct in the courtroom "to determine his sincerity
and culpability.' ' Concern over the potential impact of demeanor
upon juror decisionmaking has prompted scholars to propose
solutions. Levenson argues that because "extreme dangers exist
in allowing jurors to decide cases based on defendants'
appearances and demeanors off the witness stand, then jury
instructions should be used in every case to counter jurors'
natural instinct to judge a defendant by his looks and
mannerisms.'
C. Spectators' Courtroom Presence and Conduct
In addition to defendants' appearance and demeanor, the
presence and conduct of spectators, including victims' family
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2006, at B3 (stating that defendant Ronell Wilson "watches his trial
with the uninhabited gaze of a great card champion" and reporting that "his every blink
and yawn and whisper bears the scrutiny of the attentive, middle-aged jurors, the
families of the slain detectives,... the colleagues of the prosecutors, the policemen in
plainclothes, the curious onlookers and the defendant's mother").
37. Michael E. Antonio, Arbitrariness and the Death Penalty: How the Defendant's
Appearance During Trial Influences Capital Jurors' Punishment Decision, 24 BEHAV. SCI.
& L. 215, 233 (2006).
38. Michael Antonio & Nicole E. Arone, Damned If They Do, Damned If They Don't:
Jurors' Reaction to Defendant Testimony or Silence During a Capital Trial, 89
JUDICATURE 60, 66 (2005).
39. See Antonio, supra note 37, at 233.
40. Levenson, supra note 19, at 575.
41. Id. at 576.
42. Id. at 578.
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members, is an important part of courtroom dynamics. While the
mere presence of victims' family members as spectators may send
a message, they of course are not excluded from the courtroom
merely because of their relationship with the victim. In State v.
Richey, the West Virginia Supreme Court stated, "We must
assume that a jury has the fortitude to withstand this type of
public scrutiny, and cannot presume irreparable harm to the
defendant's right to a fair jury trial by the presence of spectators
who may have some type of associational identity with the victim
of the crime."'
Kinship to the victim is not the only controversial status
that a courtroom spectator may possess. Numerous defendants
have asserted that the presence of uniformed police officers
seated in the gallery undermined their right to a fair trial. The
U.S. Supreme Court held that a defendant was not inherently
prejudiced when, at his armed robbery trial with five co-
defendants, the customary courtroom security force was
supplemented by four uniformed state troopers sitting in the first
row of the spectator section, because there was no reason to
believe that the troopers' presence tended to brand the defendant
with guilt.44 The Court theorized that the jury may not even have
noticed that extra guards were being used in the trial or that
they most likely drew no impermissible inference from their
presence because "[guards] are doubtless taken for granted so
long as their numbers or weaponry do not suggest particular
official concern or alarm."45 Similarly, state courts have held that
the presence of off-duty, uniformed officers as spectators in the
trial of a defendant accused of shooting an officer did not violate
the defendant's constitutional rights without a showing that
police spectators significantly outnumbered civilian spectators
because there was no allegation that the officers "gravitated"
towards the jury.46
Case law has also addressed the propriety of spectators'
expressive conduct in the courtroom such as wearing buttons
with logos or victims' pictures that may be directly related to the
defendant's guilt. The test of whether a defendant's right to a
43. State v. Richey, 298 S.E.2d 879, 889 (W. Va. 1982).
44. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567-72 (1986).
45. Id. at 569.
46. Davis v. State, 223 S.W.3d 466, 474 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2006, pet. dism'd as
untimely); cf Woods v. Dugger, 923 F.2d 1454, 1458-60 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding inherent
prejudice when uniformed prison guards composed half of the spectators in a packed
courtroom during the trial of a man accused of murdering a prison guard, coupled with
pretrial publicity).
47. Billings v. Polk, 441 F.3d 238, 246-47 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that no
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fair trial is violated by spectator conduct is "whether 'an
unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming
into play.'
48
In Norris v. Risley, several women sat in the spectator's
gallery wearing buttons reading "Women Against Rape" during
Norris's rape trial.49 The Ninth Circuit stated that the buttons
served an obvious communicative purpose, and that "throughout
trial, the buttons' message, which implied that Norris raped the
complaining witness, constituted a continuing reminder that
various spectators believed Norris's guilt before it was proven,
eroding the presumption of innocence. "'°
The Ninth Circuit relied upon Norris in Musladin v.
Lamarque, in which Musladin claimed he shot his estranged
wife's fianc6, Tom Studer, in self-defense, intimating that Studer
was not a "victim.""' During each day of the fourteen-day trial,
Studer's family sat in the front row of the gallery, directly behind
the prosecution and in clear view of the jury, and at least three
members of the family wore buttons that were several inches in
precedents clearly established that the defendant's constitutional rights were violated
when an alternate juror wore a t-shirt reading "No Mercy-No Limits" to trial one day
and the t-shirt was seen and joked about by the jurors); see also Kenyon v. State, 946
S.W.2d 705, 710-11 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997) (holding the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that the presence of spectators seated in the front row wearing
four-inch buttons bearing a picture of one of the victims did not warrant a mistrial);
Buckner v. State, 714 So. 2d 384, 388-89 (Fla. 1998) (finding that the display of a collage
of photos of the victim and family members' display of two eight-by-ten photos of the
victim did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial); State v. Speed, 961 P.2d 13, 29-30
(Kan. 1998) (finding the defendant's right to a fair trial was not violated by the fact that
victim's family members wore buttons and t-shirts with the victim's picture on them
during the trial); State v. Nelson, 705 So. 2d 758, 763 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that the
trial court did not improperly allow victim impact statements when it permitted victims'
friends and family to wear t-shirts bearing the picture of the victim in the courtroom);
State v. Braxton, 477 S.E.2d 172, 177 (N.C. 1996) (finding that spectators wearing badges
with the victim's picture on them was not prejudicial); Nguyen v. State, 977 S.W.2d 450,
457 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. refd) (finding that the record did not demonstrate a
reasonable probability that the wearing of large buttons with a color photograph of the
deceased by seven out of twenty-five spectators influenced the jury's verdict); Davis, 223
S.W.3d at 474-75 (holding the record was "insufficient to establish actual or inherent
prejudice" when trial spectators wore medallions bearing a photo of the victim); In re
Woods, 154 P.3d 607, 616-17 (Wash. 2005) (en banc) (concluding the defendant could not
prove his right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the trial court's action in allowing victims'
family members to wear black and orange ribbons in the courtroom); State v. Lord, 114
P.3d 1241, 1243, (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (finding the trial court did not deprive the
defendant of his constitutional rights by allowing courtroom spectators to wear buttons
bearing the victim's picture during the first three days of trial).
48. Flynn, 475 U.S. at 570 (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505 (1976)).
49. Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1990).
50. Id. at 831-32.
51. Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 653, 654-56 (9th Cir. 2005).
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diameter with Studer's photograph on them.52 After he was
convicted of first-degree murder and his conviction was upheld in
state habeas appeals, Musladin challenged the photo buttons in
his federal habeas appeals, claiming that the buttons' content
improperly influenced the jury and prejudiced his defense, and
that the state court unreasonably applied established Supreme
Court law in denying him relief when it held that the photo
buttons were "unlikely to have been taken as a sign of anything
other than the normal grief occasioned by the loss of a family
member."58 Though the federal district court denied Musladin's
petition, the Ninth Circuit granted relief, stating that the photo
buttons conveyed a message that was "even stronger and more
prejudicial" than the one in Norris because "the buttons actually
depicted the individual that the defendant was charged with
murdering and represented him as the innocent party."54 This
prompted the court to determine that "the direct link between
the buttons, the spectators wearing the buttons, the defendant,
and the crime.., was clear and unmistakable."" Thus, the court
concluded, "a reasonable jurist would be compelled to conclude
that the buttons worn by Studer's family members conveyed the
message that the defendant was guilty."56 The U.S. Supreme
Court, however, addressing for the first time "the effect on a
defendant's fair-trial rights of... spectator conduct," 7 reversed
the Ninth Circuit on procedural grounds." In his concurrence,
Justice Souter stated that "[t he display is no part of the evidence
going to guilt or innocence, and the buttons are at once an appeal
for sympathy for the victim (and perhaps for those who wear the
buttons) and a call for some response from those who see them,"
which could prompt an expected response from jurors: "[The]
expected response could well seem to be a verdict of guilty, and a
52. Id. at 655.
53. Id. at 655, 658.
54. Id. at 660. After the California Court of Appeal found that the buttons did not
brand Musladin with an unmistakable mark of guilt under Flynn, the Ninth Circuit was
charged with determining whether the state court's decision resulted in a decision that
"was 'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Id. at 655 (quoting
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
(2006)).
55. Id. at 660.
56. Id. at 661.
57. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76 (2006).
58. Id. at 77. The Supreme Court stated that there was no precedent that required
the state court to apply Williams and Flynn to the spectators' conduct and so the state
court's decision had not been contrary to clearly established federal law under the
meaning of the AEDPA. Id.
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sympathetic urge to assuage the grief or rage of survivors with a
conviction . . .""
Of course, judicial concern over the defendant's courtroom
appearance and demeanor and over spectator courtroom conduct
is rooted in the need to avoid unduly prejudicing jurors against
the defendant and not concern over the behaviors in and of
themselves. After all, it is jurors, and not spectators, who
determine the defendant's fate. However, for better or worse,
victims' family members may still influence jurors by their
presence in the courtroom, by their emotional displays," by
bearing victims' photographs or pro-victim logos, and by their
trial or victim impact testimonies.6' As one journalist noted, "One
longstanding legal truism endures: The concept of family remains
a potent weapon in court. The presence of family members often
has an effect, great or small, on the outcome of the trial or
arraignment... .,,6 News coverage is replete with examples of
how victims' family members affect jurors. How else can one
explain the resolution of jurors in the McVeigh trial to "look him
right in the eye" while delivering the verdict and their desire to
provide closure through their verdict for victims' family members
and survivors,63  or account for journalistic obsession with
divining jurors' reactions to courtroom proceedings?" After one
trial which ended in a hung jury, jurors apologized to members of
the victims' family and hugged them in front of the courthouse,
saying that they felt they owed it to the victim's family to reach a
verdict and that family members' presence in court each day had
59. Id. at 82-83.
60. See State v. Glassel, 116 P.3d 1193, 1214 (Ariz. 2005) ("The fact that the family
members and jurors cried during the presentations does not warrant reversal. Senseless
murders usually generate strong emotional responses. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to
expect that murder victims' family members will often come to tears when making their
impact statements. Nor is it unreasonable to expect that some jurors will also have
emotional reactions when hearing the victims' families' accounts of the loss they have
suffered.").
61. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) ("A State may legitimately
conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the
victim's family is relevant ... as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed.").
62. David Rohde, Drama on the Docket: Relatives' Emotions Can Raise Stakes for
Defendant's Day in Court, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 9, 2000, at 12A.
63. Richard A. Serrano, McVeigh Gets Death, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 1997, at Al
("[We [the jurors] had agreed earlier that when we gave the verdict, we would look him
right in the eye. And we did, all 12 of us .... I just hope we made some sort of closure for
the people of Oklahoma City .... I hope they are pleased with what we did.").
64. See, e.g., Andrea Ford, Simpson Panelists Offer Jury Watchers Few Clues, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 1995, at Al ("[T]he enigmatic behavior of the jurors has fueled even
greater scrutiny. They are watched and commented upon constantly by those lucky
enough to have snared assigned courtroom seats.").
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been noted." This potential prompts judges to attempt to
minimize even remote interaction between jurors and spectators6
and is why defendants are permitted to request that the court
enjoin victims' families and friends from displaying emotion in
the courtroom while sitting as spectators. 7 The granting of such
a request does not mean that it will be upheld in all
circumstances, however, or that trial courts will rigorously police
emotional displays by victims' family members. As one trial judge
stated at a murder trial outside of the jury's presence, "It seems
rather unfair to kill a woman's husband and then complain
because she cries."" Finally, victims' family members may
exercise a right to meet with prosecutors in many jurisdictions,6 9
potentially influencing prosecutorial decisionmaking; prosecutors
also often consult with family members in the event that a plea
agreement is reached. °
65. Joe Duggan, Mistrial Declared in Slaying of Farmer, LINCOLN J. STAR, Mar. 29,
2007, at Al.
66. In the O.J. Simpson trial, for instance, courtroom spectators were of course
forbidden to speak to jurors but were even discouraged from maintaining direct eye
contact. Ford, supra note 64, at A23; see also Maurice Possley, Judge Tries to Rein in
Courtroom Emotions, CHI. TRIB., June 6, 1997, at 3 ("[Judge] Matsch, by his own
admission, was overcome.., by the gripping words and tears of the victims'
relatives.. . ." Matsch then "moved to reassert control over the penalty hearing.").
67. See, e.g., Chase v. State, 645 So. 2d 829, 848 (Miss. 1994) (holding the defendant
was not entitled to a mistrial in a capital murder prosecution when the murder victim's
widow, a key eyewitness to the murder, began crying on the witness stand, and other
family members began to cry, allegedly in violation of pretrial ruling against emotional
displays, because the court found the need for the widow's testimony outweighed any
prejudicial effect caused by her and the other family members' display of emotion); Evans
v. State, 422 So. 2d 737, 743 (Miss. 1982) (involving defendants who requested that the
victims' families be prohibited from displaying courtroom emotions).
68. Chase, 645 So. 2d at 848.
69. See generally Susan L. Karamanian, Victims' Rights and the Death-Sentenced
Inmate: Some Observations and Thoughts, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1025, 1028 (1998) (noting
that prosecutors work directly with victims' families); Wayne A. Logan, Declaring Life at
the Crossroads of Death: Victims' Anti-Death Penalty Views and Prosecutors' Charging
Decisions, 18 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 41, 44 (1999) ("[Tlhe constitutions of at least twenty-
nine states contain victims' rights amendments securing significant participatory rights
in criminal prosecutions, and all states as well as the federal government have enacted
laws to ensure increased victim/survivor involvement." (internal citations omitted)).
70. See Karamanian, supra note 69, at 1028. A court has rejected the claim of a
death row inmate that his equal protection and due process rights were violated when the
victim's family "vetoed" a plea agreement favorable to him; the court stated that "[tihe
state properly may consider the wishes of the victim's family in deciding whether to seek
the death penalty, so long as it does not accord undue weight to those wishes .... Arizona
crime victims have a constitutional and procedural right to confer with the state on any
prospective plea bargain." State v. Wood, 881 P.2d 1158, 1173 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc).
One well-publicized instance where victims' family members consulted with
prosecutors in deciding to accept or reject a plea agreement occurred in the trials of the
two perpetrators who murdered Matthew Shepard, in which prosecutor Cal Rerucha
obtained the parents' permission before agreeing to the plea bargain, motivating the news
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D. The Courtroom as a Communicative Forum and the Victim-
Offender Relationship
Case law addressing defendant appearance and demeanor
and spectator conduct, as well as newspaper accounts of
defendants' and jurors' displays of emotion in the courtroom,
suggest that the courtroom is not only an adjudicative forum, but
a communicative one as well.
One could go further and describe legal proceedings as a
series of communicative events that begin upon arrest; pretrial
events such as "perp walks,"7 in which suspects are displayed to
media officials, showcase defendants to the public as if to prove
investigative efficacy.72 McVeigh, for instance, was allegedly
subjected to a perp walk approximately three hours before he
was officially arrested for the Oklahoma City bombing." It is not
enough, however, to acknowledge the communicative dimensions
of legal proceedings; this recognition does not convey how very
meaningful information about the defendant and opportunities to
observe the defendant are to victims and victims' family
members. Moreover, it places unnecessary constraints on our
understanding of the victim-offender relationship, limiting it to
the criminal justice context. This is too narrow. The victim-
offender bond is not so much dependent upon legal proceedings
for its formation, but more for its maintenance. The victims'
desire for information and accountability predate a suspect's
arrest and prosecution, and perhaps are even stronger if a
suspect is never identified or cannot be found. In addition,
media to credit Matthew's parents, and not the prosecutor, with "mercy." See Julie Cart,
Killer of Gay Student Is Spared Death Penalty, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1999, at Al ("[The
prosecutor] had reservations about the deal, but finally it was Matthew's mother who
prevailed upon him to agree to spare McKinney's life."); Dave Cullen, A Dramatic Moment
of Mercy, SALON.COM, Nov. 5, 1999, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/1999/l/05/
shepard! (reporting that the prosecutor claimed the decision to accept the agreement was
ultimately his, but that he did not even enter the room where the Shepards negotiated
McKinney's sentencing agreement). For additional discussion of the Shepards' "mercy,"
see Jody Lyne6 Madeira, A Constructed Peace: Narratives of Suture in News Media, 19
CAN. J.L. & SOC'Y 93, 113-16 (2004).
71. A "perp walk" occurs "when an accused wrongdoer is led away in handcuffs by
the police to the courthouse, police station, or jail." Such events have been "featured in
newspapers and newscasts for decades." Caldarola v. County of Westchester, 343 F.3d
570, 572 (2d Cir. 2003).
72. For discussions of the communicative dimensions, ethics, and history of "perp
walks," see Ernest F. Lidge III, Perp Walks and Prosecutorial Ethics, 7 NEV. L.J. 55
(2006); Kyle J. Kaiser, Note, Twenty-First Century Stocks and Pillory: Perp Walks as
Pretrial Punishment, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1205 (2003).
73. Lidge, supra note 72, at 55 n.4 (citing Dave Krajicek, The Crime Beat: Perp
Walks, in COVERING CRIME AND JUSTICE (2003), http://www.justicejournalism.org/
crimeguide/chapterO/sidebars/chap0lxside5.html).
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information-gathering and observational opportunities exist
outside the criminal justice context. Local or national media
coverage may provide prime prospects for scrutinizing the
defendant's conduct, and victims' desire to learn about and keep
tabs on defendants does not terminate when the defendant is
sentenced at trial. Rather, criminal justice proceedings are just
one stage of a trajectory that stretches from the immediate
aftermath of the crime into a future in which victims and their
families struggle to come to terms with the crime. Therefore, it is
crucial that we regard the ties that bind victims to offenders as
involuntary relational bonds, thus contextualizing criminal
justice events-from "perp walks," to trials and sentencing
hearings, to parole and clemency hearings, and ultimately even
executions-as occurrences during which victims and family
members deepen their knowledge of the defendant and the crime
through information gathering and observation. Utilizing the
term "relationship" best captures the pervasive, persistent
nature of these involuntary ties to the defendant. The
significance of this term becomes fully apparent from an analysis
of the formation and consequences of such bonds in the context of
the Oklahoma City bombing.
III. COLLECTIVE MEMORY, CULTURAL TRAUMA, AND THE LAW
The story of victimization is the story of trauma. This Article
describes the formation of a victim-offender relationship
following an act of domestic terrorism that made bomber
Timothy McVeigh the most heinous mass murderer in U.S.
history. In the aftermath of the bombing, victims' families and
survivors grappled with two overwhelmingly powerful needs: the
need to transform fragmented emotions and recollections of the
bombing and its aftermath into more holistic narratives, and the
need to overcome individual and collective traumas-including
perceived ties to McVeigh-that challenged their ability to do so.
In order to most accurately describe these obstacles, it is
imperative to examine the ties that victims' families and
survivors perceived they shared with Timothy McVeigh through
the lenses of collective memory and cultural trauma.
A. Defining Collective Memory and Cultural Trauma
Research on collective memory helps to address the way in
which collective behaviors formed in association with the
Oklahoma City bombing, such as attendance at McVeigh's capital
trial and execution, depend on memory work. Memory work is
the process of working through and narrating experiences. As
418 [46:2
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such, it is always interpretive and constructive and concerned
with reaching closure about past events.74 Through memory
work, individuals gain distance from a life event that is
necessary to understand and contextualize it-in other words, to
position themselves in relation to that event. Memory work is
collective in the sense that individuals share many life events,
and collaborative interpretations of these events may take shape
as individuals gather and share memories and interpretations,
with the result that individual perceptions are in turn reshaped
by these communal exchanges. Groups may therefore perform
memory work by constructing areas of common knowledge which
create social bonds between members.75 Studying memory from a
collective perspective is necessary in the context of the Oklahoma
City bombing because its mass violence devastated the local
community of Oklahoma City and gelled individuals into the
tragic categories of victims' family members and survivors.
Heretofore, these groups were nonexistent; group members soon
purposefully joined together in order to cope with the bombing
and accomplish necessary tasks such as building a memorial or
advocating for reform of death penalty laws.
In essence, memory offers a form and content for addressing
the Oklahoma City bombing in that it both structures and
explains the evolving understandings of the bombing and its
perpetrators formed by individuals and groups. Compelled by the
nature of trauma itself, which acquires its horrific proportions
from its ability to destroy not only an individual's sense of
normality but the normality of the collectives that constitute that
individual's social support network, memory work has been
shown to be central to the recovery or "working through" of the
74. This is the Author's own definition; however, it contains elements of others'
writings as well. See, e.g., BARBIE ZELIZER, REMEMBERING TO FORGET: HOLOCAUST
MEMORY THROUGH THE CAMERA'S EYE 3 (1998) (describing collective memory as a tool
"not of retrieval but of reconfiguration [that] colonizes the past by obliging it to conform to
present configurations" (quoting Patrick Hutton, Collective Memory and Collective
Mentalities: The Halbwachs and Aries Connection, 15 HIST. REFLECTIONS]RPFLEXIONS
HISTORIQUES 311, 314 (1988))); id. ("Collective memories allow for the fabrication,
rearrangement, elaboration, and omission of details about the past, often pushing aside
accuracy and authenticity so as to accommodate broader issues of identity formation,
power and authority, and political affiliation."); Pierre Nora, Between Memory and
History: Les Lieux de Memoire, 26 REPRESENTATIONS 7, 8 (1989) ("Memory is life, borne
by living societies founded in its name. It remains in permanent evolution, open to the
dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations,
vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation .... ").
75. See generally MAURICE HALBWACHS, ON COLLECTIVE MEMORY 52 (Lewis A.
Coser trans., 1992) (1941) ("What makes recent memories hang together is ... that they
are part of a totality of thoughts common to a group, the group of people with whom we
have a relation at this moment ... ").
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collective, which may require processes of sense-making,
accountability, and restitution, often procured through collective
institutional means such as trials and truth commissions. 6 The
psychological and psychiatric study of trauma has been advanced
largely by investigating the presence of common symptoms
among members of a certain social group, such as soldiers who
fought in World Wars I and U." In these empirical studies, it is
the commonalities among members that enabled the formulation
of scientific conclusions about the nature of post-traumatic stress
disorder. Most importantly, traumas affect collectives long after
their survivors have passed on. The bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki and Holocaust death camps are just two examples of
traumas that happened over sixty years ago but that remain
problems with which American collective memory must grapple.78
The type of collective memory is also significant, however, for
it also implicates a theoretical subset of collective memory known
as cultural trauma. Analyzing the creation of meaning after the
Oklahoma City bombing entails documenting the creation of a
specific culture of interpretation and rehabilitation against a
larger national cultural backdrop that prompts American citizens
to feel "compelled to honor those ... who have been murdered for
an unjust cause."79 Memories of traumatic events, like those of
nontraumatic events, represent an interpretive culture that did
not emerge because it "had" to but because it was constructed by
its participants and the cumulative effects of their beliefs and
actions over time. As Alexander states, "[T]hose collective
76. See generally MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS:
FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 50, 61 (1998) (detailing how
trials, truth commissions, and other rituals provide the "memory work" that helps the
healing process); MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW 24,
28-29 (1997) (explaining the cathartic role of collective memory in the face of tragedy and
the role of criminal trials in its formation).
77. See generally PAUL FUSSELL, THE GREAT WAR AND MODERN MEMORY 325-27
(1975) (noting how vivid images of wartime horrors were imbedded in the memories of
many World War I veterans); PAUL FUSSELL, WARTIME: UNDERSTANDING AND BEHAVIOR
IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR 275-77 (1989) (noting that intense fear was shared by many
soldiers during World War II, and that many soldiers were willing to admit to such things
as being so scared they "fouled themselves").
78. See ROBERT JAY LIFTON & GREG MITCHELL, HIROSHIMA IN AMERICA: FIFTY
YEARS OF DENIAL 207-09 (1995) (introducing several groups of people who helped shape
the general memory of Hiroshima, including the President, historians, journalists,
veterans, scientists, and activists); PETER NOVICK, THE HOLOCAUST IN AMERICAN LIFE 1-2
(1999) (noting how the Holocaust was not discussed for several decades following the end
of World War II, but became a more central part of American discourse beginning in the
1970s); ZELIZER, supra note 74, at 3 (discussing how work on collective memory might
'shed light on visual memories of the Holocaust").
79. See JEFFREY C. ALEXANDER, THE MEANINGS OF SOCIAL LIFE: A CULTURAL
SOCIOLOGY 3 (2003).
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forces ... are not compulsory, the social forces to which we
enthusiastically and voluntarily respond.... We do not mourn
mass murder unless we have already identified with the victims,
and this only happens once in a while, when the symbols are
aligned in the right way."' As an event comes to be rationalized,
the socially constructed narratives about that event derive their
strength and stability from moral frameworks.
Cultural trauma occurs "when members of a collectivity feel
they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves
indelible marks on their group consciousness, marking their
memories forever and changing their future identity in
fundamental and irrevocable ways."81 Cultural trauma provides a
means by which collectives can begin to address an event
perceived as traumatic, to "not only cognitively identify the
existence and source of human suffering but 'take on board' some
significant [moral] responsibility for it."82 In this way, collectives
formulate and demonstrate "solidary relationships in ways that,
in principle, allow them to share the sufferings of
others [,] ... [and] societies expand the circle of the we.'
Conversely, not recognizing the suffering of others through
acknowledging a particular experience as traumatic bars
collectives from achieving a "moral stance."4
Cultural trauma is explicitly trauma of culture and therefore
"may reverberate in the area of affirmed values and norms,
patterns and rules, expectations and roles, accepted ideas and
beliefs, narrative forms and symbolic meanings, definitions of
situations and frames of discourse."88 Cultural trauma is
particularly invasive and damaging to a collective. Change
destroys "cultural tissue," which is particularly sensitive to
change because it is a "depository of continuity, heritage,
tradition, [and] identity of human communities," and cultural
"wounds" are "most difficult to heal" because "[c]ulture obtains a
particular inertia, and once the cultural equilibrium is broken, it
is most difficult to restore it."8'
Notably, cultural trauma is, like collective memory, a
collective process of construction; as Smelser notes, "[A] collective
80. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 85.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Piotr Sztompka, The Trauma of Social Change: A Case of Postcommunist
Societies, in CULTURAL TRAUMA AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY 155, 161 (2004).
86. Id. at 162.
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trauma, affecting a group with definable membership, will, of
necessity, also be associated with that group's collective
identity."87 "Collective" denotes not merely a mass of people, but a
group of people who elect to join together on the basis of some
core identity. This distinction is critical, for mass coping and
collective coping are not the same thing at all.88 Collective trauma
occurs when "people ... perceive the similarity of their situation
with that of others, define it as shared[,] ... start to talk about it,
exchange observations and experiences, gossip and rumors,
formulate diagnoses and myths, identify causes or villains, look
for conspiracies, decide to do something about it, [and] envisage
coping methods."8
The process of designating an event as "traumatic" is a
claims-making process in which a certain group enunciates "a
claim to some fundamental injury,... and a demand for
emotional, institutional, and symbolic reparation and
reconstitution."" In attempting to apply a trauma claim to an
event, claims makers must effectively articulate a master
narrative that is "[a] signification spiral" enunciating the nature
of the pain (what happened that was allegedly traumatic), the
nature of the victim (whom did the allegedly traumatic event
affect), the relation of the trauma victim to the wider audience
(what shared qualities lie between the audience and the alleged
victims of the trauma), and attribution of responsibility (who was
the perpetrator).9'
Trauma claims-making is "powerfully mediated by the
nature of the institutional arenas.., within which it occurs."92 In
the Oklahoma City context, this includes the institutions of the
law and of mass media, each of which shapes trauma claims in
particular ways and imposes particular institutional
consequences. According to Alexander, when the "cultural
classification" of an event as traumatic "enters the legal realm, it
will be disciplined by the demand to issue a definitive judgment
of legally binding responsibilities and to distribute punishments
87. Neil J. Smelser, Psychological Trauma and Cultural Trauma, in CULTURAL
TRAUMA AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY 31, 43 (2004).
88. Id. at 48.
89. Sztompka, supra note 85, at 160.
90. ALEXANDER, supra note 79, at 93.
91. See, e.g., KENNETH THOMPSON, MORAL PANICS 31-42 (1998) (exploring the
process of the signification spiral through 1960s Britain where British youth were vilified
and portrayed as perpetrators of general moral decay).
92. See Jeffrey C. Alexander, Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma, in CULTURAL
TRAUMA AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY 1, 15 (2004).
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and material reparations."93 The law as an institution narrows
trauma claims to specific stages of the process of constructing an
event as traumatic, such as the attribution of responsibility;
"[s]uch a demonstration may have nothing at all to do with the
perpetrators themselves accepting responsibility or a broader
audience identifying with those who suffered as the trauma
drama plays out."94 As a form of mediation, mass communication
may provide heretofore inaccessible outlets for the dramatization
of trauma and may allow one interpretation of an event to gain
an edge over other competing interpretations. Yet, processes of
constructing trauma "become subject to the restrictions of news
reporting, with their demands for concision, ethical neutrality,
and perspectival balance," and may be "exaggerated and
distorted" due to the competition between news outlets. 9"
The successful construction of trauma is rather
anticlimactic, consisting of the naturalization of the traumatic
designation. Of course, if an event is labeled as traumatic it will
affect how that event is "experienced, and thus imagined and
represented," necessitating that "collective identity. . . become
significantly revised."96  Once this re-remembering or
reconstruction has been accomplished, however, there is a
"calming down" period during which "[tihe spiral of signification
flattens out, affect and emotion become less inflamed,
preoccupation with sacrality and ... liminality gives way to
reaggregation."97 It is during this period that memorialization of
the trauma is fixed into place and the "'lessons' of the trauma
become objectified in monuments, museums, and collections of
historical artifacts."98 Alexander refers to this period as the
"triumph of the mundane,"99  but maintains that this
naturalization is itself natural because reactions to the trauma
cannot be maintained at fever pitch forever. Rather, this
naturalization of trauma indelibly confirms it as such and
enables the trauma to be continually accessed and shared:
The inevitability of such routinization processes by no
means neutralizes the extraordinary social significance of
cultural traumas. Their creation and routinization have, to
the contrary, the most profound normative implications for
93. ALEXANDER, supra note 79, at 98.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 100.
96. Id. at 103.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 104.
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the conduct of social life. By allowing members of wider
publics to participate in the pain of others, cultural
traumas broaden the realm of social understanding and
sympathy, and they provide powerful avenues for new
forms of social incorporation. °
Significantly, without this naturalization, there could be no
reconstructive process, or what Sztompka terms "social
becoming," when the "[t]rauma appears as a stimulating and
mobilizing factor for human agency, which through coping with
and overcoming of trauma contributes to the 'morphogenesis of
culture."""'
B. Collective Memory, Cultural Trauma, and the Law: "Doing
Justice"
Today there is a perception that, in the words of Elias
Canetti, the dead "are nourished by judgment," and that criminal
law is a "means of recompensing the slain through a deliberative
act."'O' Agents of legal institutions are summoned forth to answer
the call of history, guised in the sheep's wool of collective
memory, to redress traumatic injuries and preserve certain moral
truths for the benefit of future citizens. But do we choose to
acknowledge the law as an institutional vehicle for collective
memory? Or do we instead favor a "strict separation between the
legal and the extralegal, between the rule of law and the
interests of collective instruction"?103
Culturally traumatic events often serve as focal points for
ritual commemoration because critical reassessment can provide
opportunities for a "decisive moment of collective refounding."'04
In the wake of culturally traumatic events, then, there is a need
for what Victor Turner called "social dramas," ritual processes of
social scrutiny and ultimately recovery.' Trials, including
criminal prosecutions, are social dramas; criminal law is
especially akin to the formation of collective memory since its
deterrence concerns are future oriented, where collective memory
locates greater social solidarity, but its retributive concerns are
past-oriented, where collective memory finds its narrative
content.'
100. Id.
101. Sztompka, supra note 85, at 194.
102. LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT 1 (2001).
103. Id. at 2.
104. OSIEL, supra note 76, at 27.
105. Id. at 16-17.
106. Id. at 18.
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The notion that criminal trials can contribute to social
solidarity originated with Emile Durkheim; as Garland notes,
"[Tihe rituals of criminal justice-the court-room trial, the
passing of sentence, the execution of punishment-are, in effect,
the formalized embodiment ... of the conscience collective."'°7 The
act of imposing punishment reflects the process of working
through an event which threatens the conscience collective. Legal
decisions thus become touchstones for the formation of collective
memory, as they "set the tone for the public's response at the
very moment that they claim to express it" and "prefigure
popular sentiment and give it a degree of definition which it
would otherwise lack.""8 "Justice" becomes the operative concept
for social solidarity, involving a consensus both that certain acts
committed are wrong and must be punished. Justice as a concept
also has meaning for the many and the few-for society and for
victims-and recent decades have witnessed the increasing
influence of private justice needs on public justice demands. The
needs of victims' families have come to be a paramount concern
as prosecutors make private concerns-a need for closure-into
reasons for public support for and application of capital
punishment."°9
Collective memory is furthered by legal processes of the
formation and enunciation of stories. In the criminal trial,
prosecutors serve as public spokesmen who "tell the stories
through which such sentiments are elicited and such
membership consolidated.""0 These stories are "about individual
rights: the myriad forms of the human flourishing that the
exercise of such rights permits and that their violation wrongly
forecloses.""' In these stories, the free will of the perpetrator
assumes primary importance; his choices dictate the outcome of
the story and bring about the victim's death."2 After prosecution,
imposing punishment "signals the greater or lesser presence of
collective memory in a society" because it is the punishing of
those who commit the most unacceptable acts that reinforces our
107. DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL
THEORY 67 (1990).
108. Id. at 58.
109. In the McVeigh trial, for instance, the selection of victim impact witnesses was
explicitly choreographed to produce a death sentence. See Bruce Shapiro, Victims'
Rights-and Wrongs, SALON.COM, June 13, 1997, http://www.salon.com/june97/news/
news970613.html (noting that "the prosecution wanted an execution" and chose victims to
participate accordingly).
110. OSIEL, supra note 76, at 29.
111. Id. at 72.
112. Id. at 72-73.
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awareness of what those acts are.' The ability to enunciate and
fix stories in legal frames, then, becomes an important source of
social power."'
As an institution, however, the law is of limited efficacy as a
vehicle of collective memory. The usefulness of legal proceedings
is constrained by two concepts: (1) its modesty, or superficial
unwillingness to play such a formative mnemonic role; and (2) its
practices, which, though traditional, limit the breadth and depth
of inquiry and focus on binary categories such as guilty or not
guilty.
Because of its storying potential, citizens may expect legal
proceedings to take a formative role in adjudicating history as
well." However, courts have often protested taking on this task
on the grounds of "modesty.""6 In the socially potent trial of Adolf
Eichmann, the Israeli court explicitly invoked judicial modesty in
rejecting such a definitive role, pleading that it was too
shortsighted and lacked the requisite authority:
[T]he Court ... must not allow itself to be enticed to stray
into provinces which are outside its sphere.
... [Tihe Court does not possess the facilities required for
investigating general questions of the kind referred to
above.... As for questions of principle which are outside
the realm of law, no one has made us judges of them and
therefore our opinion on them carries no greater weight
than that of any person who has devoted study and thought
to these questions.
Courts are nonetheless conscious that their opinions "prompt
particular value commitments on the part of the participants and
the audience and thus act as a kind of sentimental education." 8
The irony is that courts pay lip service to judicial modesty,
but cater to processes of collective memory formation despite
themselves; a court "cannot quite contain itself from proclaiming
the trial's 'educational significance' and 'educational value."'' 9 At
113. Id. at 31.
114. Cf W. JAMES BOOTH, COMMUNITIES OF MEMORY: ON WITNESS, IDENTITY, AND
JUSTICE, at xi (2006) ("[Who tells those stories, and what they contain, how certain
persons and events are made to stand out ... while others are... forgotten, is itself a
story of filiation, power, and memory within the community.").
115. OSIEL, supra note 76, at 82.
116. It is Osiel who introduces this use of "modesty." Id. at 80, 246.
117. CrimC (Jer) 40/61 Attorney-General v. Eichmann, [19611 IsrDC 45(3),
translated in 36 I.L.R. 5, 18-19 (1968), affd, CrimA 336/61 Attorney-General v.
Eichmann, [1962] IsrSC 16(2033), translated in 36 I.L.R. 277 (1968).
118. GARLAND, supra note 107, at 67.
119. OSIEL, supra note 76, at 81.
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a minimum, judges are aware that "their judgment will
inevitably be viewed as making history and that their judgment
will itself be subject to historiographical scrutiny."12 °
The efficacy of the law as a vehicle for collective memory is
also hampered by its narrow focus on questions of guilt and
innocence-an inquiry whose scope is unlikely to reach the social
implications of that criminal behavior. Legal conclusions are
inherently professionalized, derived through the application of
legal principles to decide disputes on the basis of evidence
introduced and evaluated in accordance with legal doctrine, all
orchestrated by procedural rules. Thus, "[tihe central concerns of
criminal courts ... are often decidedly at odds with the public's
interest in a thorough, wide-ranging exploration of what caused
such events and whose misconduct contributed to them."121 In
addition, legal practices may be tedious and droll to a public
hungry for dramatic developments. Even the Nuremberg trials
seemed to many reporters as dull and of little dramatic import;
novelist Rebecca West, covering the trials for The New Yorker,
declared them to be "insufferably tedious."22 It is true that trials
perceived as dull by members of a social collective who lack a
direct connection to the acts or individuals subject to judgment
may contain other meaning for those intimately connected with
these affairs. In addition, many participants saw dullness as a
necessary characteristic of proceedings against McVeigh, an
inherent result of the detailed presentation of evidence required
to obtain a conviction. 123 Thus, dullness is a professionally
necessary as well as a morally required quality of an effective
criminal prosecution.
Legal practices may themselves constrain the impact of a
trial upon collective memory. Evidentiary and procedural rules
mandate that evidence be introduced in specific ways and limit
elicited testimony to forms of questioning acceptable on direct or
cross-examination. In addition, the law's singular focus upon the
criminal suspect(s) narrows the scope of inquiry to the deeds and
motives of these individuals, which means that the victims' story
is often excluded. Thus, the legal narrative is a necessarily
incomplete one. Other institutional actors, such as historians or
sociologists, may need to step in to supplement the historical
record of events whose memory consists largely of a legal record
120. Id. at 82.
121. Id. at 80.
122. Id. at 91.
123. See Shapiro, supra note 109 (stating that the McVeigh trial "offered little
tension beyond grim, almost banal procedural momentum").
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focused on objective proof of the crime and not the subjective
experience of the event. In addition, the "attitude of sanctity [in
which traumatic testimony is ordinarily regarded] is deeply at
odds with the skeptical, scrutinizing posture of any competent
cross-examiner, such as defense counsel."' 4 Witnesses-and their
testimony-are on trial.
The law's efficacy as a vehicle of collective memory is
directly imperiled when an offender receives a sentence that is
perceived as inappropriate-when the punishment does not fit
the crime. In the context of the Oklahoma City bombing, Nichols
was convicted only of involuntary manslaughter in federal
proceedings, although many study participants 125 believed that he
should have been convicted of first-degree murder, necessitating
that he be tried again in Oklahoma state court. In situations
such as this, adjudicative conclusions seem "morally
compromised" because "what is most urgently desired by those
seeking a complete accounting.., is a thorough condemnation of
all those sharing significant responsibility.., plus a publicly
enforced recollection of enduring 'debt' to victims and their
families thus incurred."
126
Yet another limiting factor is that the law does not explicitly
acknowledge its socially constructed nature, unlike "fickle"127
collective memory, which acknowledges that it incorporates past
constructions and that it will be reshaped by future constructive
processes. Legal reluctance to acknowledge the primacy of social
construction stems from its needs for finality and fixation; legal
doctrines such as "res judicata, collateral estoppel, stare decisis,
double jeopardy, mandatory joinder, statutes of limitations, and
restrictive standards of appellate review" are designed to
discourage or thwart altogether the subsequent reinterpretation
of precedent.' In the law's eyes, the past informs the present by
binding it, not by providing structuring lines to support
constructions. The only situation in which legal practitioners
overtly acknowledge constructive processes is the act of legal
"interpretation."'29 Yet, legal actors construct proceedings every
day simply by allowing them to be mediated-not only by
allowing reporters and cameras into the courtrooms, but also by
124. OSIEL, supra note 76, at 104.
125. Throughout, the Author refers to interviewees as "participants" and denotes
specific participants by assigned number, not by name.
126. OSIEL, supra note 76, at 164.
127. Id. at 217.
128. Id. at 216.
129. Id. at 242.
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reserving room for them in the front rows of the courtroom and in
establishing media pens inside courthouse lobbies, in addition to
actively orchestrating certain legal activities such as the perp
walk for maximum mediated effect.
As a result of the mismatch between the means to the law's
ends and the formation of collective memory, the law is caught
between a need to maintain the legitimacy of its institutional
narratives and to satisfy diverse justice needs. The law as an
institution, then, cannot bear the weight of collective memory
alone any more than any other social institution; its "credibility
in telling a national story, one that will powerfully shape
collective memory, is thus alternately threatened by the
narrowness or breadth of the narrative framing."'' ° Instead, the
law contributes to organic processes of collective sense-making.
Habermas, for one, suggests that "courts may do for society at
large what psychoanalysis does for individuals. They must
unearth repressed memory of historic trauma, forcing the
'patient' to work through its enduring ramifications, so that he
can confront the present on its own terms, not by acting out of
unresolved issues."'3 '
As the law sees itself as an institution with the potential to
shape collective memory, it becomes changed by that potential,
aware of, and thus more vulnerable to, the same movements that
influence collective memory formation. Postmodernism has
brought new challenges to the collective sense-making processes,
including problematizing the primacy of legal proceedings as a
storying forum; "we have even become suspicious of stories
themselves, that is, of their capacity to capture and impart
important truths," and so our "desire to have real events display
the coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure of an image of life
that is and can only be imaginary" is now recognized to be only a
desire, and not actual coherence, integrity, fullness, and
closure.'32 Similarly, the law is also subject to new responsibilities
to new populations, such as victims' families. Legal conclusions
must now "affirm as well-warranted the victims' feelings of
resentment and indignation, for this affirmation is the only way
for society at large to show that it acknowledges and takes
seriously their condition as victims." 3 Legal proceedings can be
therapeutic under the right circumstances, contributing to
victims' self-respect when "their suffering is listened to in the
130. Id. at 164.
131. Id. at 173.
132. Id. at 257.
133. Id. at 273.
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trials with respect and sympathy, the true story receives official
sanction, the nature of the atrocities are publicly and openly
discussed, and their perpetrators' acts are officially
condemned."
13 4
An involuntary victim-offender relationship is part of how
victims and their family members come to terms with a crime,
including the formation of a narrative understanding of the event
that constructs the crime as a trauma and defines its traumatic
contours. In the Oklahoma City context, had the perceived
relationship with McVeigh not been so disturbing for victims'
family members and survivors due to McVeigh's perceived
defiance and callous disregard for the lives lost in the broadcast
of his antigovernment message, it may have been easier for these
individuals to think through what had happened, enhancing
their ability to cope with the bombing.
IV. VICTIM-OFFENDER RELATIONSHIPS IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING
A. Choosing the Oklahoma City Bombing as a Case Study Site
The Oklahoma City bombing is an ideal context in which to
study the formation of a perceived victim-offender relationship
for several reasons. McVeigh was not only a popular target of
media coverage, but also generated media statements, granted
media interviews, authored newspaper editorials, and
collaborated on a book authored by journalists Lou Michel and
Dan Herbeck"' This heightened media presence made McVeigh
a very visible defendant, and much was publicized about his
childhood, ideology, and behavior. In addition, McVeigh's co-
defendant, Nichols, was in many ways his foil, appearing soft
where McVeigh was hard, ashamed where McVeigh was
remorseless, and emotional where McVeigh was stoic. Nichols's
behavior therefore approached that of the "ideal" criminal
defendant who remorsefully accepts responsibility.136 Finally, the
large victim population-comprised of both victims' families and
134. Id. (quotation omitted).
135. See Lou MICHEL & DAN HERBECK, AMERICAN TERRORIST: TIMOTHY MCVEIGH
AND THE OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING, at xvi-xxi, 378, 380, 403 (2001) (explaining McVeigh's
role in collaborating on the Michel & Herbeck book as well as his other contact with the
media).
136. Displays of remorse are encouraged. For instance, remorse has been considered
by courts as mitigating evidence at sentencing. See, e.g., State v. Jones, Nos. 48152-5-I,
51738-4-I, 2003 WL 22230128, at *7 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2003) (stating that
remorseful defendants "speed up the healing and closure process for their victims").
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survivors-enables a researcher to gauge not only whether a
victim-offender relationship formed but also the frequency with
which individuals perceived such a relationship and the strength
of those perceptions.
To select the Oklahoma City bombing as a case study
context, however, is to choose the exception and not the rule. The
Oklahoma City bombing is atypical in nearly every respect,
rendered unique by the very same factors, such as extraordinary
amounts of media coverage and large number of victims, that
make it an ideal context in which to study the formation and
implications of a victim-offender relationship. Future articles
will explore the development of victim-offender relationships in
less unusual instances of violent crime, such as rape or murder
cases that receive little to no media attention.
Although the Oklahoma City bombing as a case study
provides an excellent portrait of a negative victim-offender
relationship that is destructive and disruptive, fettering victims'
families and survivors to the bombing for years afterward, it is
important to remember that a victim-offender relationship need
not be negative. While victims are unlikely to possess warm
feelings towards defendants in the immediate aftermath of their
crimes, it is possible for victims to form healing relationships
with offenders, perhaps through initiating contact with a
convicted defendant who is serving a sentence or through victim-
offender mediation programs. In addition, a negative victim-
offender relationship does not preclude victims from feeling
sympathy for offenders' family members, particularly in capital
cases. It is most likely, however, that victim-offender
relationships are overwhelmingly likely to have negative
implications immediately after their formation, perhaps due in
part to the adversarial nature of the criminal justice system, and
to metamorphosize into positive relationships only after the
defendant has been held accountable for his actions and only if
the defendant expresses responsibility and remorse."'
137. Of course, murders affecting religious communities whose tenets stress the
importance of Christian forgiveness are exceptions to this rule. When Charles Roberts
murdered five girls at the West Nickel Mines Amish School in 2006, one of the key themes
in newspaper coverage of the brutal killings was the Amish "grace" that enabled them to
forgive the killer and reach out to his family. "Hours after the shootings, several
Amish... walked to the homes of the shooter's widow, parents, and parents-in-law to
express sympathy and offer forgiveness .... When [the killer] was buried, about 30
members of the Amish community attended and mourned." The Amish also contributed to
a fund for the killer's children. Art Carey, Among the Amish, a Grace That Endures,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 2, 2007, at Al.
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B. Institutional Constraints and Communicative Interaction
with Offenders
In the context of the Oklahoma City bombing, research
participants perceived that they shared an involuntary
relationship with Timothy McVeigh that cast a negative aura
upon reconstructive social frameworks of memory. This hindered
the recovery process by "manipulating" the victims through the
media until his execution in June of 2001. Participants could not
help but incorporate this involuntary relationship as part of their
collective memory formation, and they did so in ways that
delayed or at the very least unsettled the healing process. In the
Oklahoma City context, the victim-offender relationship was
entirely mediated by institutions. It was first facilitated by the
news media and then boundaried by the criminal justice system,
which controlled "exposure" to McVeigh and created forums such
as the trial and execution where family members and survivors
could assess McVeigh's behaviors. Interestingly enough, the
criminal justice system even provided the backdrop for media
coverage of McVeigh while he was imprisoned; Ed Bradley's 60
Minutes interview with McVeigh was filmed in his cell on death
row.
These constraints were in tension with the historical
treatment of victims in criminal prosecutions, with key tenets of
the victims' rights movement, and with recent state reforms
designed to expand victim participation in criminal trials and
executions. Victim participation in death penalty jurisprudence
and practice has grown increasingly complicated from medieval
times to the present day. Before the criminal justice system
evolved as a state institution, victims were responsible for
initiating criminal charges and even prosecuting offenders.'39 The
state, however, gradually took over the tasks of criminal
prosecution and sentencing, minimizing victim participation
until they were altogether excluded from the process, and only
granted the participatory rights enjoyed by other citizens.'
Execution itself was also radically different; mid-nineteenth
century executions in America were typically public hangings in
the courthouse square by the local sheriff,4' and executions in
138. McVeigh Vents on "60 Minutes," CBSNEWS.COM, May 11, 2001,
http://www.cbsnews.conmstories/2000/03/13/national/mainl7l231.shtml.
139. For a history of victim involvement in prosecutions, see Lynn N. Henderson, The
Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 938-39 (1985).
140. Id. at 939 (explaining the subordination of blood feuds to the public interest).
141. NEGLEY K. TEETERS, HANG BY THE NECK: THE LEGAL USE OF SCAFFOLD AND
NOOSE, GIBBET, STAKE, AND FIRING SQUAD FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 6, 59,
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eighteenth and seventeenth century London were very dramatic
public spectacles where prisoners were paraded before mobs
eager for entertainment.
42
In contrast, contemporary capital cases involve extended
pretrial periods and trials, result more frequently in life
sentences rather than death sentences, include occasional
reversals and retrials, often see a decade or more transpire
between sentence and execution, and incorporate numerous
initiatives focusing on victims' rights and interests.
Significantly, capital trials now commonly involve victims'
families with much greater regularity and centrality than in
earlier eras due to the advent of victim impact testimony and
very recent accommodations made to assist victims' families in
witnessing executions.4 The Victims' Rights movement of the
1980s won an increased role for victims in securing the
defendants' punishment for most crimes, and victims' family
members battled through a succession of Supreme Court cases
(Booth v. Maryland,45 South Carolina v. Gathers46 ) before
winning the right to present "victim impact evidence" at the
penalty stage of a capital trial in 1991 in Payne v. Tennessee.'
Furthermore, states have increasingly accommodated victims'
family members throughout the capital trial and execution. By
2004, thirty-five states had instituted a position of Victim
174(1967).
142. See generally PETER LINEBAUGH, THE LONDON HANGED: CRIME AND CIVIL
SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 18-19, 50-51, 91-92 (1992) (detailing various
London public executions and the development of England's regime of capital
punishment).
143. See Douglas A. Berman, A Capital Waste of Time? Examining the Supreme
Court's "Culture of Death," 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 861, 872 (2008) (complaining of the
inevitable delays and numerous appeals associated with capital cases); Henderson, supra
note 139, at 949-50 (explaining the increasing prevalence of victims' rights measures);
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts,
Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 713 (2005) (speculating on the
deterrent effects of capital punishment given the infrequent imposition and characteristic
delays).
144. See generally Marilyn Peterson Armour & Mark S. Umbreit, The Ultimate Penal
Sanction and "Closure" for Survivors of Homicide Victims, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 381, 401-02
(2007) (describing legislative developments in victim impact evidence); John H. Blume,
Ten Years of Payne: Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 257,
263-64, 267, 269-70 (2003) (chronicling the advent of victim impact evidence and its use
in capital cases).
145. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987) (concluding that the introduction of
victim impact statements at sentencing violated the Eighth Amendment).
146. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 808-12 (1989) (rejecting as irrelevant
the prosecutor's discussion of the victim's character during sentencing).
147. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825, 827 (1991) (holding that states may
allow introduction of victim impact evidence in capital cases).
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Advocate responsible for maintaining contact with victim family
members throughout condemned prisoners' successive appeals,
preparing them for the execution, and actually attending the
execution with victims' family members."'
Additionally, in the 1990s two themes converged to make
victim-related issues of even more immediate importance: the
suggestion that imposing and carrying out a death sentence
brought needed "closure" to victims' families, and the notion that
justice requires carrying out executions in the name of murder
victims and their survivors. Currently, advocates and opponents
of capital punishment both claim that the death penalty has a
profound effect on the families of murder victims; the former
assert that it provides them with "closure," the latter assert that
it further victimizes them. Criminal justice officials themselves
use "closure" as support for capital punishment.4
The constraints placed around Timothy McVeigh's
prosecution and execution vastly limited opportunities for
communicative engagement; participants not only were
prevented from interacting interpersonally with McVeigh, but
had to fight to witness legal proceedings from a distance in three
contexts. First, after the trial judge granted McVeigh's attorney's
request for a change of venue from Oklahoma to Colorado and
refused to broadcast the trial back to Oklahoma City by closed-
circuit feed, family members and survivors petitioned Congress
to ensure that this broadcast occurred.' Second, after the trial
judge refused to allow a slew of family members and survivors to
attend the trial because they were slated to give victim impact
testimony during sentencing, these individuals again asked
Congress to pass legislation (known as the "Victim Rights
Clarification Act of 1997""') allowing them to both attend the
penalty phase of the trial and testify at sentencing. 2 Third,
148. See Carroll Ann Ellis, Karin Ho & Anne Seymour, The Impact of the Death
Penalty on Crime Victims and Those Who Serve Them, in WOUNDS THAT Do NOT BIND:
VICTIM-BASED PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 17 at 431, 438; ANNE
SEYMOUR & STEVE DERENE, NATIONAL SURVEY OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL OFFICES: THE
SCOPE OF VICTIM SERVICES (2004).
149. See, e.g., Mario M. Cuomo, The Crime Victim in a System of Criminal Justice, 8
ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 1, 20 (1992).
150. Gaylord Shaw, Okla. Bomb Victims to See Trial on TV, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 16,
1996, at 51.
151. Victim Rights Clarification Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-6, 111 Stat. 12 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3510 (2006)).
152. See David E. Aaronson, New Rights and Remedies: The Federal Crime Victim
Rights Act of 2004, 28 PACE L. REV. 623, 629 (2008) (explaining the origins of the Victim
Rights Clarification Act of 1997); The Victim Rights Amendment, 42 HARV. J. LEGIS. 525,
548 (2005).
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angered by the fact that only ten victims (assigned by lottery)
were permitted to witness McVeigh's execution in Terre Haute,
family members and survivors had to petition Attorney General
Ashcroft to broadcast McVeigh's execution back to Oklahoma
City via closed-circuit feed so that additional witnesses could be
accommodated.
15 3
It is not surprising that such institutional mediation would
alter reconstructive memory processes. Legal institutions,
including the police, judiciary, and penal systems, specialize in
capturing, prosecuting, and punishing an offender impersonally,
concentrating on the offender and not on his victims.
Institutional outrage at crime stems not from the human loss
crime engenders but from the legal violation itself. Victims, in
contrast, cannot remain impersonal but are submerged in an
emotive role; their orientation to the crime is relational, their
outrage stemming from an intimacy lost through criminal
behavior. Victims cannot relate to institutional technology. Thus,
while institutions are indirectly affected by a violation of a
disembodied law, victims are directly affected by an embodied
crime made manifest through a lost beloved body.
The lynchpin in the relationship between victims' families
and survivors and McVeigh was that he be held accountable for
his role in the bombing, whether or not forcing accountability
upon him later led him to accept responsibility for his heinous
deed. The successful formation of new individual and social
frameworks of memory demanded that McVeigh be tried and
sentenced for his crimes-tasks that in a nation-state are solely
within the province of the state or federal criminal justice
systems. Thus, the criminal justice system also was at the helm
of the accountability process that was key to the reconstruction of
collective memory. Its institutional routines left indelible
fingerprints upon the pursuit of accountability, defining the
scope of inquiry into the bombing and investigating McVeigh's
criminal intent. The result was that the accountability inquiry
was narrowed to a question of guilt and innocence, which of
necessity excluded queries that were not legally relevant but still
meaningful to victims' families and survivors.
153. See David Johnston, Justice Dept. Sets Procedures for Viewing McVeigh's Death,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2001, at A17 (describing the additional procedures put into place to
accommodate the victims in viewing the execution); McVeigh Victims' Kin Will Get to See
Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2001, at A27 (reporting Attorney General Ashcroft's
decision to allow closed-circuit television viewing of the execution); Jim Yardley,
Execution on TV Brings Little Solace, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2001, at A26 (detailing the
closed-circuit broadcast provided to victims of the Oklahoma City bombing).
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In addition, victims' families and survivors were merely
bystanders to the adjudication of guilt or innocence, aside from
the handful who testified in the guilt phase of the trial; the
primary actors in this drama were the trial judge and members
of the prosecution and defense teams. Allowing victim impact
testimony during sentencing proceedings did somewhat mitigate
the silencing of victims' families and survivors, but the
statements of such witnesses were very closely circumscribed.
Criminal trials are key to the production of collective memory but
are problematic vehicles of collective memory by themselves.
Their specialized inquiries break down under the weight of
memory's demands if asked to bear that full weight alone, and so
must be supplemented by other endeavors. Nonetheless, the
criminal justice system not only controlled visual access to
McVeigh through the media and legal proceedings, but also
affected the formation of collective memory through manners as
diverse as how expeditiously the trial was held, how it was held
(e.g., whether it was broadcast to other venues), whether family
members and survivors were allowed to attend, what verdict was
handed down, and whether the sentence was carried out.
C. The Importance of the Victim-Offender Relationship
Existing methods of researching the psychological and
emotional states of homicide survivors are incomplete in and of
themselves in addressing the experiences of victims' families and
survivors. The phenomenon of how victims process the aftermath
of murder, including how they understand legal proceedings, and
how they witness and interpret an execution, cannot be
accounted for merely by analyzing the processes of going through
grieving "stages,"'54 attending or testifying in legal proceedings,
154. Research on traumatic grief began in 1917 with Freud's portrait of grief
pathology in Mourning and Melancholia and continued through the 1900s. Scholarship on
grief and mourning, including in the context of homicide, elaborates varying numbers of
"stages" or "processes" that victims' families encounter after loss of a loved one. See JOHN
BOWLBY, Loss: SADNESS AND DEPRESSION 85 (1980) (describing four stages: numbness;
yearning and searching for lost figure; disorganization and despair; and reorganization);
ELIZABETH KUBLER-ROSS & DAVID KESSLER, ON GRIEF AND GRIEVING: FINDING THE
MEANING OF GRIEF THROUGH THE FIVE STAGES OF LOSS 7 (2005) (enumerating five stages
of loss experienced by the dying but extended to bereaved survivors: denial; anger;
bargaining; depression; and acceptance); J. WILLIAM WORDEN, GRIEF COUNSELING AND
GRIEF THERAPY: A HANDBOOK FOR THE MENTAL HEALTH PRACTITIONER 10-18 (2d ed.
1991) (describing four tasks of mourning: to accept reality of loss; to work through pain of
grief, to adjust to environment without the deceased; and to emotionally relocate the deceased
and move on); Erich Lindemann, Symptomatology and Management of Acute Grief, 101
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 141, 142 (1944), reprinted in 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 155, 156 (1994)
(listing three stages: emancipation from bondage to deceased; readjustment to environment
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witnessing the reading of the guilty verdict or the execution, or
media representations of victims. Significantly, each of these
approaches positions the victim as a passive self, a body that
travels through grief stages, a body that attends the trial and
perhaps witnesses the execution, a body that can be represented
by others. This creates the impression that victims are both
defined and confined by these models and their codes of behavior.
An alternate approach is to examine the phenomenon of homicide
survivorship as an involuntary relationship between the victims'
family and the offender, a bond that exists even when neither
party knew the other prior to the murderous act, and that like
any other has communicative dimensions, structured through
speech and silence.
This relationship is rarely tacitly acknowledged (and never
explicitly defined) in criminological scholarship. It is a concept
whose logic is the combined logic of several facts-publicity about
the offender and the murder, the victims' families' need to know
why and how the crime occurred, and the necessity of
understanding the offender in order to answer those questions at
least in part. How could victims' families help but feel they know
an offender through the plethora of intimate details that emerges
through contemporary media coverage? Sharp notes that
coverage of Jeffrey Dahmer's murders extended to thorough
details of his personal life: "the type of beer he drank, his
cigarette preference, the types of potato chips he ate, and the
brand of baking soda he used in his refrigerator." 5' This
relationship may also extend to offenders' families; offenders,
their families, and even their communities may be roped together
into a category of otherness, set apart by disgust and hatred,
with offenders' family members experiencing intensely negative
publicity.
56
What is the communicative nature of this relationship? In
the context of the Oklahoma City bombing, it was a relationship
in which victims' impressions of McVeigh as a man and, in some
cases, as a monster, contextualized his mannerisms and his
statements. It was a relationship characterized by perceptions of
communicative iniquity, inequity, and inequality, in which
victims and survivors perceived they had little communicative
control over McVeigh. McVeigh was seen to have great
communicative agency and an ability to communicate with
without deceased; and formation of new relationships).
155. SuSAN F. SHARP, HIDDEN VICTIMS: THE EFFECTS OF THE DEATH PENALTY ON
FAMILIES OF THE ACCUSED 1 (2005).
156. Id. at 36.
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family members and survivors despite their antipathy towards
such efforts, while victims and survivors had to settle for
channeling their own communications through media or through
victim impact testimony. It was a relationship pregnant with
communicative necessity and perceived obligation, in which
victims and survivors very much wanted to hear why and how
McVeigh carried out the bombing and yearned in many cases to
speak with him in person. It was a relationship whose only
possibility of termination lay in the death of McVeigh or of
victims and survivors themselves.
In addition, this involuntary relationship between McVeigh
and family members and survivors profoundly influenced the
formation of collective memory and the resolution of cultural
trauma because it was perceived as a challenge to processes of
identity reconstruction described earlier. As will be discussed
shortly, because of the understandings of McVeigh that evolved
amongst participants, many described McVeigh's continued
existence as a barrier on the road to "recovery" and resolution.
McVeigh occupied one camp in the involuntary relationship
between family members and survivors and the offender, and
therefore was bound to them. This also meant that McVeigh
became a part of the collective, instead of being cast outside it.
The inclusion of McVeigh in the collective was traumatizing to
family members and survivors because it directly affected the
narrative resolution of trauma and delayed family members' and
survivors' control over the resolution process. At any time a
message could issue from McVeigh (or an old media statement
could resurface) that would potentially aggravate wounds just
starting to heal. Thus, the collective memory of homicide-
including that of the Oklahoma City bombing-was shaped not
only by the events of the murder but also by occurrences for the
duration of the involuntary relationship.
Significantly, refocusing research on the victim-offender
relationship also recognizes that victims and survivors define, as
well as become defined by, the experiences of survivorship. It
implies an exchange, a give-and-take of activity and passivity,
and acknowledges that processes of sense-making are mutually
constructive and cyclical, and not self-constructive and linear.
Victims change and alter conceptions of grieving in the course of
healing; they are active participants in the trial with the
potential to change its practices and potentials, and they
challenge representations of victims in addition to conforming to
existing representations.
Finally, refocusing research on the victim-offender
relationship also effectively organizes how participants made
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sense of the chaos of post-bombing social relations. It explains
why the vast majority of participants, regardless of political
views on the death penalty, felt relief in the wake of the
execution which terminated the involuntary relationship that
had begun six years before.
D. Perceptions of a Victim-Offender Relationship with McVeigh
In the wake of homicide, family members and survivors
become involuntarily and intimately linked to the offender
through the offense, so that they must "live with" the offender to
a greater or lesser extent, often until death-either the offender's
or their own. As Janice Smith, a family member whose brother
was murdered in the bombing, stated in a media interview after
McVeigh's execution on June 11, 2001, "It's over. We don't have
to continue with him any more.""' The obligations of this linkage
are contradictory; on the one hand, the offender has murdered at
least one family member, yet on the other, the offender is often
the only possible source of information about the offense and the
victim's last moments. This linkage is also most often mediated;
through news coverage, other forms of media, and trial
proceedings, victims become very familiar with the offender's
personal history, including his family. Victims and offenders may
hear each other's statements through press conferences, media
interviews, trial testimony, books or websites, or other forms of
public communication. Less often, victims and offenders may
communicate more directly, through letters or by meeting face-
to-face through mediation programs. Such communicative
interchanges deepen and contextualize the victim-offender
relationship. There may even be a sense that family members
and survivors are an offender's "audience," and an interactive
positioning develops based on this perception. Constance
Richardson, a nonparticipant family member whose twenty-year
old daughter was murdered in the bombing, chose to visit the
memorial on the morning of June 11, 2001, instead of witnessing
the execution by closed-circuit, stating "I didn't want to be part of
his audience."58
Intensive interviews with family members and survivors
revealed a perceived intentionality, a conviction that statements
made by McVeigh were targeted to these individuals to further
wound them. As Participant 21 stated, "it [seemed] like every
time he turned around, he was doing something to jab at us and
157. Bryant, supra note 1.
158. Id.
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it was just very painful because he could sit there behind those
bars and get ... three square[ I [meals] a day and everything and
not have all these worries. .. ."
Many participants attributed malicious intent to McVeigh's
communications; for instance, Participant 24 stated, "I have
always felt like that if, if McVeigh and Nichols for example had
access to the family members, survivors, through the media,
through books, through whatever purposes they had that it
would always just be keep digging at us, sticking that knife and
twisting." Participant 25, however, contrasted McVeigh's intent
with that of Nichols:
McVeigh, even though he knew that he was getting the
death sentence, he was defiant all the way up to the point
where it actually happened, okay? He would speak out to
the media.... And everything that he did was doing
nothing but hurting the family members here in
Oklahoma.... Nichols is a little different because since he's
been tried and convicted, you don't hear about him.... I
can live with him being in prison for the rest of his life, for
the simple reason that he is not defiant and he's not going
out and getting on the news and so forth and trying to hurt
the family members.
Termination of media coverage allowed Participant 15 to
cease to think of McVeigh: "I've quit completely, stopped thinking
about him the day they executed him." This intimation of
malicious intent through media contact was especially strong
when McVeigh made a statement that family members found
especially painful. One of the most wounding messages that
family members and survivors recalled hearing from McVeigh
was his terming the murders of the children in the America's
Kids daycare center in the Murrah Building "collateral
damage."1"9
Significantly, family members and survivors embodied their
relationship to McVeigh in how they worded their responses to
interview questions, creating the impression of a dialogue
between themselves and McVeigh.' Participant 21 referred to
McVeigh jabbing "at us," while Participant 5 stated that McVeigh
has hurt "me." Participant 25 noted that McVeigh "would tell the
families," and Participant 24 spoke in terms of McVeigh and
Nichols having "access to the family members, survivors through
the media, through books." In addition, participants seemed at
159. See MICHEL & HERBECK, supra note 135, at 234.
160. Participants were not asked any questions addressing how they felt towards
McVeigh or whether they perceived that they were tied to him in any manner.
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times to assert that McVeigh would not have sincerely meant any
apology that he may have given at his execution.
E. The Victim-Offender Relationship as a Para-Social
Relationship
Attempts to define exactly what interactions constitute
interpersonal communication are fraught with peril. As Knapp et
al. remark, "[A]ttempts at specifying exactly what interpersonal
communication is and is not are often frustrating and fall short of
consensus."' Communication scholars disagree on "the number
of communicators involved, the physical proximity of the
communicators, the nature of the interaction units used to
explain an encounter, and the degree of formality and structure
attending the interactants' relationship."'62 Perhaps all it is
possible on which to agree is that interpersonal communication
involves: "(1) at least two communicators intentionally orienting
toward each other, (2) as both subject and object, (3) whose
actions embody each other's perspectives both toward self and
toward other."6' Cappella emphasizes influence as the focus of
interpersonal communication analysis: "[I]f interpersonal
communication has any essential feature, it is that persons
influence one another's behavior over and above that attributed
to normal baselines of action."' Despite this lack of consensus,
however, certain definitional practices are more common than
others. For instance, it is most common to limit the number of
participants in an interpersonal encounter to two, and it is
frequently assumed that such interactions are face-to-face
exchanges involving close physical proximity.'65
Though family members and survivors perceived themselves
to be the targets of McVeigh's statements, such communication
does not fit within the narrowest formulation of the interpersonal
communication interaction, which involves face-to-face meetings
between two participants consisting of a simultaneous "two-way"
exchange of meaning.66 All message exchanges outside of the
161. Mark L. Knapp et al., Background and Current Trends in the Study of
Interpersonal Communication, in HANDBOOK OF INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION 3, 8-9
(Mark L. Knapp & John A. Daly eds., 3d ed. 2002).
162. Id. at 9.
163. 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMMUNICATIONS 336 (1989).
164. Joseph N. Cappella, Interpersonal Communication: Definitions and
Fundamental Questions, in HANDBOOK OF COMMUNICATION SCIENCE 184, 228 (Charles R.
Berger & Steven H. Chaffee eds., 1987).
165. Knapp et al., supra note 161, at 9.
166. See PETER HARTLEY, INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION 20-24 (2d ed. 1999).
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trial context were mediated. At trial, those witnesses who
testified in McVeigh's trial were involved in interpersonal
exchanges with the attorneys who were eliciting direct testimony
from or cross-examining them, and not with McVeigh himself. It
is entirely possible that there was an actual interpersonal
interchange between McVeigh and trial witnesses, for
participants recall looking at McVeigh during their testimony
and remember their impressions of his reactions. However, even
this interaction is not what is meant by a purist definition of
interpersonal communication. So how best to explain the
intimacy of the communicative relationship between McVeigh
and his victims, to account for participants' perceptions that
McVeigh was speaking to them?
In 1956, Horton and Wohl published an article in Psychiatry
seeking to explain television viewers' perceived relationship to
television personalities.'67 Terming this illusory relation a "para-
social interaction," Horton and Wohl defined it as "the illusion of
face-to-face relationship with the performer" in which "[tihe
conditions of response to the performer are analogous to those in
a primary group."6 ' This relationship is built upon a cumulative
exchange of affective messages between the personality, termed
the "persona," and the audience, whereby the audience is "subtly
insinuated into the program's action and internal social
relationships and, by dint of this kind of staging, is ambiguously
transformed into a group which observes and participates in the
show by turns."'69 Para-social relationships are characterized by a
"lack of effective reciprocity" because "[tihe interaction,
characteristically, is one-sided, nondialectical, controlled by the
performer, and not susceptible of mutual development"; thus,
"the audience is free to choose among the relationships offered,
but it cannot create new ones."17  Despite the lack of
communicative give and take, the persona who is the focus of the
para-social relationship becomes integrated into the audience
member's social circle as a familiar presence. 71 Significantly, this
presence is above all a reliable presence. Nonetheless, however
artless this relationship may appear, it is also a strategic and
constant one. Producers formulate the persona's character
167. Donald Horton & R. Richard Wohl, Mass Communication and Para-Social
Interaction: Observation on Intimacy at a Distance, 19 PSYCHIATRY 215, 215 (1956),
reprinted in INTER/MEDIA: INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION IN A MEDIA WORLD 188-89
(Gary Gumpert & Robert Cathcart eds., 2d ed. 1982).
168. Id. at 188.
169. Id. at 189-90.
170. Id. at 189.
171. Id. at 190.
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specifically to enhance audience members' loyalty to the
persona. 7 2 Subsequent research into para-social relationships
further suggests that this illusory intimacy, the subjective
creation of audience members, is actually taken as "real."'73 Para-
social relationships continue to pervade media usage today.'74
Audience members are expected to adapt to the engineered
relational format with the persona as it is offered; they may not
alter it and so must continue the relation on those inflexible
terms. Thus, "[tihe audience is expected to accept the situation
defined by the program format as credible, and to concede as
'natural' the rules and conventions governing the actions
performed and the values realized."'75 For this to occur, audience
members must be susceptible to a "coaching of attitudes":
The acceptance by the audience of the role offered by the
program involves acceptance of the explicit and implicit
terms which define the situation and the action to be
carried out in the program. Unless the spectator
understands these terms, the role performances of the
participants are meaningless to him; and unless he accepts
them, he cannot 'enter into' the performance himself.'
But audience members' willingness to be susceptible to this
coaching is entailed in the role of audience membership itself.
Subsequent research into para-social relationships further
suggests that this illusory intimacy, the subjective creation of
audience members, is actually taken as "real."
172. See id. at 195-96 (stating that the persona's character is developed in order to
encourage the audience "to assume a sense of personal obligation to the performer").
173. Analyzing the para-social relationships that viewers of television news form
with newscasters, Levy notes, "Even though this affective tie is completely the subjective
invention of the audience, para-socially interactive viewers believe it is genuine and they
interpret the behavior of the news personae as reciprocating this 'real' bond." Mark R.
Levy, Watching TV News as Para-Social Interaction, 23 J. BROADCASTING 69, 78 (1979),
reprinted in INTERIMEDIA: INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION IN A MEDIA WORLD, supra
note 167, at 185.
174. In the wake of "Crocodile Hunter" Steve Irwin's death on September 4th, 2006
from a stingray barb embedded in his chest, this popular figure was publicly mourned,
becoming the leading celebrity story despite others such as the debut of Katie Couric on
the CBS Evening News, Rosie O'Donnell's arrival on The View, and the release of the first
photographs of Suri Cruise. David Williams, Irwin's Death Strikes a Chord, CNN.COM,
Sept. 7, 2006, http://www.cnn.com2006/SHOWBIZ/TV/09/06/irwin.outpouring/index.html.
One CNN story on the intense coverage of Irwin's death and public mourning featured a
media expert who directly attributed the phenomenon to the strong para-social
relationships Irwin fostered in audiences: "Every now and again a TV star has the ability
to transcend the electronic barrier of what a television is and really feel like they're one of
the family." Id.
175. Horton & Wohl, supra note 167, at 194.
176. Id. at 195-96.
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There is of course a parallel between audience members who
sit inert and watch television and victims' family members who
are forced to spend at least most of the guilt and sentencing
phases of a trial (with the possible exception of victim impact
testimony) as passive witnesses in the courtroom gallery.
Victims' families are for the most part consigned to a spectator
role during the trial of "their" perpetrators. Either they play by
the rules of "protocol" and "decorum," remaining present but
passive, or they do not gain access to the trial. In order to be part
of the courtroom audience, victims' families must also accept
restrictions upon displaying tearful emotions and wearing
clothing or buttons displaying their loved ones' photos.1'7
Like all media consumers, Oklahoma City bombing
survivors and family members had been schooled in the audience
role, taught to feel both affiliation for media personalities who
they would like to have in their primary social circles, and a
corresponding dislike for personalities who somehow threatened
or opposed the characters to which they were partial. As such,
they were already experienced in discriminating between positive
and negative para-social relations with regard to television
"heroes" and "villains." Because the media limelight also
transforms criminals into horrific celebrities, familiarity with
mass media also frames the ways in which we form perceptions
of these most monstrous defendants. This phenomenon is so
pervasive that media consumers may even process unfolding
news accounts of criminal defendants and their nefarious deeds
by comparing them to older celebrity criminals, including the
most "evil" of celebrity murderers such as Ted Bundy or Charles
Manson. McVeigh, of course, was purposefully constructed as
such a criminal villain, whose murderous acts and lack of
remorse rendered him deserving of condemnation and scorn.
Researchers have always construed the persona that is the
target of the para-social relation as being in the position of a
para-social "friend," someone who is likeable and trustworthy'
This type of investiture can be termed a positive para-social
relationship, or an investiture of positive affect in a persona. But
logically, if one can have relationships with para-social "friends,"
then one may also have relationships with para-social "enemies,"
opening the door to the formation of negative para-social
177. See supra Part II.C (detailing restrictions on the presence and appearance of
courtroom spectators).
178. See Horton & Wohl, supra note 167, at 191 (describing the persona as "a friend,
counselor, [and] comforter"); Levy, supra note 173, at 185 (construing the persona as
friendly and reliable).
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relationships. Negative para-social relations have the same
characteristics as their positive counterparts, though these
characteristics form an identification that is the inverse of that
encouraged by the positive relation. A para-social relation with
an "enemy" also frames spectators' perceptions of the performer,
enabling persistent dislike and animosity. Whereas the positive
para-social persona is an "ingroup" member, a desirable
associate, the para-social enemy is an outsider, a deviant "other."
Victims are as encouraged to be loyal to their hatred of criminal
personas as audience members are encouraged to admire their
media personas. Realizing how negative para-social relations are
cultivated also necessitates broadening the application of the
concepts of "media" and "media producer," extending them from
the narrower context of mass media to the broader context of
social institutions that may take on strategic mediating roles-
including criminal justice officials who orchestrate the arrest and
trial of criminal offenders, from the perp walk to incarceration or
execution. The media certainly plays a key role, however, in
transforming an offender into a sort of media celebrity whom
viewers are encouraged to "love to hate."
Courts have noticed that the perp walk in particular
displays the suspect "to the world, against his will, in handcuffs,
and in a posture connoting guilt."'79 In Lauro v. Charles, the
Second Circuit found that a defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights had been violated when he was subjected to a staged perp
walk in which he was restrained by handcuffs, made to walk
outside the precinct house to a waiting car, driven around the
block, then forced to walk back inside the precinct in front of
television cameras.' Terming this "an inherently fictional
dramatization of an event that transpired hours earlier," the
Second Circuit stated that such a reenactment lacked any
legitimate law enforcement purpose.18' The court stressed,
however, that its holding did not encompass those perp walks
"where a suspect is photographed in the normal course of being
moved from one place to another by the police," and that it had
not addressed whether it was proper for the police to notify the
media in advance that a suspect was to be transported. 2
From participants' attributions of malicious communicative
intent to McVeigh and the degree to which their responses
attributed a dialogic character to their interactions with
179. Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202, 212 n.7 (2d Cir. 2003).
180. Id. at 212-13.
181. Id. at 213.
182. Id.
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McVeigh, it is clear that there was ample evidence of a negative
para-social relation between family members and survivors and
McVeigh. McVeigh was their para-social enemy, the one who,
however mediated his communications may be, both had the
potential to communicate and actually communicated with the
intent of inflicting further harm on an especially vulnerable and
wounded population. However, while the para-social relationship
as a concept implies that the victim-offender relationship was
illusory, it was so only in the sense that participants spoke in
terms of an unfortunate intimacy with McVeigh that never
developed from interpersonal contact. McVeigh actually initiated
the relationship, after all, by traumatizing them, injuring them,
and murdering their loved ones. Thus, this "illusory" relationship
had very real traumatic effects.
The intimacy of this negative para-social relation was
particularly ironic in light of the impersonal nature of the
Oklahoma City bombing itself. According to numerous media
interviews and statements made to the authors of his biography
American Terrorist, McVeigh saw himself as standing in
opposition to the U.S. government, at the narrowest opposing the
government agencies involved in Waco and Ruby Ridge, and
explained that he chose to bomb the Murrah Federal Building
because he thought that it would make a spectacular media
target, not out of personal animosity toward anyone who worked
in the building or anything housed in the building.' Yet, the
bombing immediately became intensely personal for family
members, survivors, and the nation, through iconic images such
as that of the dying Baylee Almon, the one-year old baby girl
cradled in the arms of Oklahoma City firefighter Chris Fields.'
The impersonality of the bombing was an incomprehensible
affront to family members and survivors, who could not see it in
those terms.
F. Proxemics and the Para-Social Relationship
How did the para-social relationship between McVeigh and
victims' families and survivors come about? It originated in an
institution that helps to establish an event as culturally
traumatic-the mass media.
Because para-social identification is enhanced or
discouraged by the construction of mediated images of a persona,
183. See MICHEL & HERBECK, supra note 135, at 166-69.
184. Thomas Huang & Stephen Power, Image Symbolizes Devastation, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Apr. 22, 1995, at 31A.
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the visual technology of mediated images plays a key role in the
formation of such relationships. Meyrowitz contends that an
affective relationship can be encouraged by the composition of a
television shot, such that "the way in which a person is framed
may suggest an interpersonal distance between that person and
the viewer."'85 Meyrowitz finds support for his assertion in two
sources. First, Meyrowitz relies upon Edward T. Hall's theory of
proxemics, or interpersonal distance, to bolster a "possible
relationship between perception of interpersonal distance and
the 'framing variable,"' or the distance between viewer and
viewed, because at "any given interpersonal distance one sees a
specific amount of the other person clearly."186 Meyrowitz finds
additional support in the work of artist Maurice Grosser's theory
of the portrait, which "suggests that distance is a significant
factor in shaping viewer response."18 7 According to Grosser, "the
portrait is distinguished from other painting formats in that the
closeness of artist and model yields 'the peculiar sort of
communication, almost a conversation, that the person who looks
at the picture is able to hold with the person painted there.""88
Applying the theories of Hall and Grosser, Meyrowitz argues
that the para-social identification of viewers with viewed
personae is enhanced by technological reproduction of key
interpersonal proxemic distances. According to Meyrowitz, there
is a "visual 'relationship' between the viewer and the image"
which exists for the duration of the television viewing.'89 This
relationship is altered by the "framing variable," or the distance
at which a shot places the viewer from the viewed: "The subject
may be shot in close-up, medium shot, or long shot. This framing
variable creates a mediated distance between the viewer and the
content of the image. " "' Actions in long shots "tend to be viewed
in terms of abstract 'events,'" and "close-ups focus attention on
personal characteristics and response," with intensity of response
being related to shot distance.' In addition, some shots portray
an "objective distance" of a detached observer, while others
utilize a "subjective distance" that allows audience viewers to
185. Joshua Meyrowitz, Television and Interpersonal Behavior: Codes of Perception
and Response, in INTER/MEDIA: INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION IN A MEDIA WORLD,
supra note 167, at 221, 225.
186. Id. at 223, 225.
187. Id. at 225-26.
188. Id. at 226; see also MAURICE GROSSER, THE PAINTER'S EYE 9 (1951) (explaining
the unique intimacy characteristics in the framing and dimensions of a portrait).
189. Meyrowitz, supra note 185, at 226.
190. Id. (emphasis omitted).
191. Id. at 229.
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assume the perspective of a character.' 2 Also relevant is
Goffman's concept of "front," "that part of the individual's
performance which regularly functions in a general and fixed
fashion to define the situation for those who observe the
performance." 3  "Personal front" includes manner and
appearance, and "front region roles" are roles that reflect onstage
behavior in which someone plays out an idealized conception of a
social role.9  Significantly, "It]he enemy is generally seen in front
region roles only."9 5
Media coverage of McVeigh was limited to two "moments":
shots of McVeigh being escorted to and from the courthouse in
Oklahoma City by law enforcement, and an Emmy-award
winning 60 Minutes interview that aired March 12, 2000, which
Ed Bradley conducted with McVeigh while he was on federal
death row.9 The perp walk shots most certainly portrayed
McVeigh in the "front region" role of criminal and social enemy.
These photos featured McVeigh in an orange jumpsuit
surrounded by federal marshals; his face angular, his jaw set,
and his countenance blank, McVeigh stared (or squinted) into the
harsh glare of the Oklahoma sun. McVeigh's fixed stare was
clearly the captivating element of these images. Thus, it is not
surprising that the perp walk images were the photographs of
McVeigh that most frequently appeared in media coverage of the
Oklahoma City bombing, and that his profile from these shots
later became the centerpiece of news graphics headlining
execution stories.'97 Ed Bradley's 60 Minutes interview, on the
other hand, allowed McVeigh to explain himself in his own
words, yet the interview alternated between camera shots of
McVeigh captured over Bradley's shoulder, positioning the
viewer in the interrogator's chair, and close-ups of McVeigh's
facial expressions.' 8
192. Id. at 227.
193. Id. at 232.
194. ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 23-24 (1959);
Meyrowitz, supra note 185, at 233-34 (contrasting Goffman's front region from the
antitheatrical back region).
195. Meyrowitz, supra note 185, at 236.
196. See 60 Minutes: Interview by Ed Bradley with Timothy McVeigh (CBS television
broadcast Mar. 12, 2000).
197. See, e.g., The Execution, USATODAY.COM, June 11, 2001, http'/fwww.usatoday.com/
newstnation/mcveighindex.htm (juxtaposing McVeigh's perp walk image against a heart
monitor line in the headline graphic); The Execution of Timothy McVeigh, TRIBUNE-STAR
(Terre Haute), June 13, 2001, http'/specials.tribstar.con/mcveigh/mdex.html (displaying
McVeigh's profile from the perp walk image).
198. 60 Minutes: Interview by Ed Bradley with Timothy McVeigh, supra note 196.
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Further attention was drawn to McVeigh's staring behavior
by textual descriptions of these very same images. Early media
stories described McVeigh's expression as that of "hard eyes unlit
by the faintest flicker of emotion," the look of a man whose "name
didn't mean much then but the image did," the stare of "a poker-
faced killer in a crewcut."199 This first impression resurfaced
continually, including on the morning of his execution: "In his
last moments, his face was as blank as it was that April day six
years ago when America first saw him escorted out of an
Oklahoma jail."2"' Interestingly, early media constructions of
McVeigh were recycled into subsequent constructions,
snowballing upon one another to produce a coherent but
redundant image of McVeigh as para-social enemy. Thus,
McVeigh's staring behavior became crucial in the construction of
McVeigh as a para-social enemy.
The heavy media focus on the perp walk images could easily
have influenced the early impression formation of family
members and survivors, engendering expectancies regarding the
import of his communicative behaviors. Impression formation
upon initial acquaintance is rapid, or even instant, as the
subconscious makes its "highly stereotypic" impressions.2"1
Because what can be gleaned from introductory verbal exchanges
is restricted by convention, nonverbal cues such as "stable
physical appearance and kinesic and vocalic cues" are especially
significant in "shaping interpersonal expectations and in
generating a frame for the parties' interpretation of subsequent
behavior."2 2 Moreover, interactants require only very brief
glimpses of behavior to form "fairly accurate and strong
judgments of actors. " "' The rapidity of impression formation is
necessary because humans are "driven by an underlying need for
uncertainty reduction" and by a need for sense-making." 4
Significantly, humans' initial impressions of unfamiliar
individuals are highly consistent, but are more accurate as to
judgments of sex, age, occupation, and social status than as to
199. Sam Handlin, Profile of a Mass Murderer: Who is Timothy McVeigh?, COURT TV
NEWS ONLINE, http://www.courttv.coninews/mcveigh special/profile-ctv.html (last visited
Apr. 10, 2009).
200. McVeigh Shows No Remorse at Execution, COURT TV NEWS ONLINE,
http://www.courttv.con/news/mcveigh-special/0612_noremorse-ap.html (last visited
Apr. 10, 2009).
201. Judee K. Burgoon & Gregory D. Hoobler, Nonverbal Signals, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION, supra note 161, at 240, 262.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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attitudes, values, and personality traits."5 Initial impressions are
"highly persistent, even in the face of subsequent contradictory
cues," and humans seem to seek out communicative information
that confirms first impressions.2 6
Thus, the moment when family members and survivors were
"introduced" to McVeigh via media broadcast of the perp walk
was very likely when they formed initial impressions of McVeigh
as a person and a perpetrator. Significantly, this footage or still
shots from it were rebroadcast frequently and repeatedly in
ensuing years on local and national news, thus reinforcing the
visual cues from which the initial impression was formed.
Several execution witnesses, unprompted by the interviewer,
remarked on the similarities between McVeigh's stare during the
execution and his staring behavior in previous media images. For
instance, Participant 22, a closed-circuit witness, stated, "[hie
didn't just look. He had that same look in his eyes when they
arrested him. Do you remember him coming out of the court
house and that stern look on his face? That's the look he
had.... Like [he was] defiant." Participant 15, another remote
witness, stated in response to the inquiry of whether McVeigh's
gaze during the execution seemed cold, "Yes, very cold. He was
the whole time. Any time you ever saw him on TV." These
comments revealed not only that witnesses were aware of how
McVeigh was constructed in and by the news media as a person
and an offender, but that they found these constructions
meaningful.
G. The Victim-Offender Relationship and the Prosecutorial
Pursuit of Accountability
The negative para-social relationship that victims' families
and survivors perceived they shared with the defiant McVeigh
also colored their perceptions of his behavior during his capital
trial.
Significantly, participants' remarks provide evidence of the
strong belief of the Oklahoma City victims and survivors
community (especially habeas group members) that institutions
such as the criminal justice system must privilege their needs,
most obviously by allowing attendance and participation in
criminal trials. This belief pervades victims' and survivors' views
on trial attendance and participation, and thus is a crucial part
of understanding how participants came to draw a link between
205. Id. at 263.
206. Id. at 263-64.
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such activities and recovery. Participants believed that they had
rights to attend and be involved in proceedings; Participant 22
referred to both "our right to testify" and "our right to attend."
Similarly, Participant 28 recalled that victims and survivors
gathered to persuade Ashcroft to arrange a closed-circuit
broadcast of McVeigh's execution and asserted that "we had the
right to attend" McVeigh's execution: "[I]f we want to witness
then we should have been able.., to witness it. That's our right."
These uncompromising claims caused quite a bit of friction
between victims and survivors and the criminal justice
institution. Such claims are also solid tenets of the victims' rights
movement, in which victims claim the right to be kept informed
of each development and the right to participate in criminal
proceedings. Unfortunately, these demands have the effect of
channeling victims' and survivors' expectations and hopes into
the criminal trial, an institutional product that is not victim-
centered in either its focus (which is upon the defendant's
actions) or in its inquiry (which centers upon guilt or innocence).
In the Oklahoma City context, the exercise of these "rights"
became most concrete in two separate incidents when victims
and survivors instituted legal appeals to the Tenth Circuit and
ultimately lobbied Congress to override decisions by U.S. District
Judge Matsch, which would limit or prohibit attendance at
McVeigh's trial. In 1996, after McVeigh applied for and received
a change of trial venue from Oklahoma City to Denver, Colorado,
victims and survivors hired Oklahoma City attorney Karen
Howick to fight for McVeigh's trial to be broadcast back to
Oklahoma City via closed-circuit."7 On April 24, 1996, after an
intense lobbying effort by victims, Congress passed legislation as
part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, allowing for closed-circuit broadcasts of trials that are
moved out of state or relocated 350 miles or more from the
original trial location."'
Moreover, Judge Matsch initially ruled that victims and
survivors slated to give victim impact testimony at sentencing
could not attend the guilt phase of McVeigh's trial, in keeping
with the practice of barring trial witnesses from attending
207. Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press, City Council Relocates to
Federal Court, Blocks Cameras, NEWS MEDIA & L., Winter 2001, at 27, available at
http://www.rcfp.org/news/mag/25-llbct-citycoun.html.
208. 42 U.S.C. § 10608 (2006) provides that when a federal court changes the trial
venue out of the state in which the case was initially brought to a venue more than 350
miles from the location in which the proceedings originally would have taken place, the
court must order closed-circuit televising of the proceedings to be broadcast at the original
location to permit victims who qualify under the statute to watch the trial proceedings.
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proceedings before testifying. 9 A group of victims and survivors
appealed Judge Matsch's ruling to the Tenth Circuit, which
upheld the ruling. Subsequently, another appeal was instituted.
Participant 22, who was heavily involved in efforts to change
Judge Matsch's ruling and who worked in the Oklahoma City
Attorney General's office at the time, recalled that there was a
sense that that route was going to be unsuccessful. After an
intensive lobbying effort, legislation allowing victims to be
present at trials was brought before Congress and passed with
historic speed. As Participant 22 recalls:
[A]s it turned out the [Attorney General] and I went back
[to Washington] and watched it pass the floor... [ofl the
House ... one day and the floor of the Senate the next day.
And then it was signed into law that evening by Clinton.
So... in two days time it passed both Houses and [was]
signed into law.
This legislation, known as the Victim Allocution
Clarification Act of 1997, states amongst other provisions that "a
United States district court shall not order any victim of any
offense excluded from the trial of a defendant accused of that
offense because such victim may, during the sentencing hearing,
testify as to the effect of the offense on the victim and the victim's
family .... ,,210
Survivors and victims' families also believed that they were
entitled to accountability, achieved through the trials of the
bombing suspects. As soon as Timothy McVeigh and Terry
209. Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states in pertinent part that "[a]t the
request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the
testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own motion." FED. R. EVID.
615. Victims' or family members' right to be present during proceedings is therefore
qualified. See generally OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CRIME
VICTIM'S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT 1-3 (2001), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc
publications/bulletins/legalseries/bulletin3/ncj189187.pdf (discussing various statutory
schemes permitting or constraining victims' right to attend the criminal trial of their
offender). Pursuant to this rule, Judge Matsch initially barred all victims and family
members who might testify during the punishment phase from attending the trial and
preliminary hearings. Maurice Possley, Oklahoma Victims Barred from Court, CHI. TRIB.,
June 27, 1996, at 4N. Judge Matsch reconsidered the decision in October 1996 but did not
change his ruling. Julie DelCour, Blast Victims to Appeal Ruling, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 1,
1996, at A18.
210. 18 U.S.C. § 3510(b) (2006). It took extensive lobbying, two appeals to the Tenth
Circuit, and a "show of support from 49 congressional members and six state attorneys
general" for Congress to pass the Victim Allocution Clarification Act of 1997, allowing
victims' families and survivors to witness the trial proceedings regardless of whether they
gave victim impact testimony. See Penny Owen, Victims Have Power to Move Congress,
DAILY OKIAHOMAN (Okla. City), Mar. 19, 1997, at 4. The bill was introduced on March 5,
1997, and signed fifteen days later. Gary Fields, Judge Lets Victim-Witnesses View
McVeigh Trial, USA TODAY, Mar. 26, 1997, at 3A.
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Nichols were identified as the perpetrators, victims' families and
survivors of all political persuasions looked forward to the day
when they would be held accountable. Even before trial, however,
victims' families and survivors felt that McVeigh was defiant.
Perhaps this para-social impression affected expectations of
McVeigh's behavior at trial. What is certain, however, is that
victims' families and survivors who attended the trial either by
closed-circuit broadcast or in person were truly positioned
opposite to McVeigh, their aggressor and antagonizer. It was in
this trial forum that victims' families and survivors sought
accountability-not only in holding McVeigh responsible, but also
in identifying his motivations and the origins of his criminal
intent so as to answer the (potentially unanswerable) queries of
"why" and "why us."
Thus, the accountability inquiry took on an interpersonal
dimension that penetrated beyond the question of guilt or
innocence. It was profoundly important to victims' families and
survivors that they seek to understand both McVeigh and
Nichols as persons and offenders, to gauge the depths of these
men who had wrought such destruction. The offenders' bodies
were literally bodies of evidence that family members and
survivors could scrutinize for insights essential to their
emotional and psychological reconstruction. The following
diagram illustrates this relationship between victims'
families/survivors, offenders, and the bombing.
Family Members/
Survivors
(Mediated
through media/
CJ institution)
McVeig Bo bing
Nichols as Event]
Figure 1: The Relationship Between Victims'
Families/ Survivors, Offenders, and the Bombing
Seeing the offenders' behavior provided insight not only into
the mediated victim-offender relationship, solidifying family
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members' and survivors' perceptions of McVeigh and Nichols, but
also into the relationship between McVeigh and Nichols and the
bombing, which allowed trial attendees to speculate how the
offenders felt about the bombing-whether they regretted or took
pride in it. Family members and survivors had to form such
perceptions to negotiate the involuntary victim-offender
relationship; for example, it was necessary to apprehend how one
felt towards McVeigh and how one believed McVeigh felt about
the bombing in order to integrate the offender into the
reconstructive process.
Family members and survivors could attend McVeigh's trial
in two locations: live in Denver, or via closed-circuit television at
the FAA center in Oklahoma City. Those who attended the trial
in Denver constantly scrutinized the defendants' behaviors. As
Participant 25 noted, these behaviors "were some of the things
that we [were] trying to watch and see how both of them would
react under [the] circumstances." This suggests that the
defendants' bodies were objects on which memory work could be
performed. Participant 17 described the intensity of this
behavioral scrutiny: "[D]uring lunch breaks... [family members
and survivors were] talking... [about] what McVeigh did at the
table, ... some facial expression that he had, ... or how he sat on
the chair .... " The nature of the Denver courtroom as a public
space seemed to enhance such surveillance. Participant 19, a
victim impact witness in McVeigh's trial, described the Denver
courtroom as a more "intimate" space; she enjoyed attending the
trial in Denver because of the increased opportunity to see "body
language" and other communicative cues: "fflou could see
demeanor of the body language, you could hear the vocal quality
and the way that the witness was talking and so forth."
The heightened physical proximity between attendee family
members and survivors and McVeigh enabled a revelation for
some. Participant 28 was struck by McVeigh's humanity upon
seeing him in person for the first time during the Oklahoma City
change of venue proceedings: "[B] ut it hit me too, he's just a man.
He's a man. You know, in my mind he was a monster. But he
really was a man." But the continued presence of McVeigh could
also be unnerving; as Participant 28 stated of the FAA trial
broadcast, "IT]he camera was set on Judge Matsch and we could
see the attorneys .... Sometimes you could see him when he
leaned back .... [T]hat was pretty unnerving, you know,
upsetting .... " Thus, McVeigh's body could serve as a mnemetic
magnet, directly immersing onlookers once more in the horror of
the bombing.
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Impressions of McVeigh's behavior at trial not only
confirmed earlier perceptions of his defiant demeanor formed
from media images of his "perp walk," but also explicitly
contrasted with impressions of Nichols's behavior as a solemn,
remorseful offender. The beginning of McVeigh's trial meant that
another institution besides the news media would offer visual
access to McVeigh as a defendant. Not surprisingly, McVeigh's
demeanor in the courtroom bolstered his behavior "as seen on
TV." The most frequent characterizations of McVeigh at his trial
reflected an "inappropriate" emotion or reaction to the trial
event; McVeigh was described variously as inappropriately
jocular, sarcastic, arrogant, unemotional, and unremorseful.
Presumably, the ideal defendant should be solemn, respectful,
remorseful, and intimidated by the machinations of justice
moving against him. These very same qualities appeared in the
most frequent characterizations of Nichols, wherein Nichols was
emotional, shamed, quiet, and nervous. The entire range of
characterizations of the two defendants is summarized in table
form below.
Characterizations of Characterizations of
McVeigh's Behavior Nichols's Behavior
Inappropriately happy/Joking More emotional
Sneering/Sarcastic Opposite of McVeigh
Evil Ashamed
Maliciously interested in the Nervous
hurt he had effected
Proud/Arrogant Refined
Aggressive Quiet
Unremorseful Afraid
Unemotional
Impassive/Unreadable
Cold
Callous
Cowardly
Table 1: Participants' Characterizations of
McVeigh and Nichols at Trial
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One of the most pervasive trial witness characterizations of
McVeigh was as an unemotional defendant whose reactions were
nonexistent or impossible to interpret. Participant 2, for instance,
stated that McVeigh "was always just sitting there
expressionless, never showed any remorse. Never showed any
emotion. He was just like a statue there." Participants associated
this passivity with callousness, a capacity for deceit, or evil.
Another of the most pervasive characterizations of McVeigh was
as a proud or arrogant perpetrator who enjoyed attending the
trial; for instance, Participant 8 stated, "He is a cold son-of-a-
bitch and he sat there arrogant and looking like he was enjoying
the show." The moments of inappropriate jocularity and
informality contrasted with other moments in which McVeigh
was obviously paying a great deal of attention to the proceedings.
Participant 25 also described McVeigh as "very aggressive" and
very involved at times: "He watched a lot of the ... people
testifying. He got involved in a lot of it. When they brought out
parts and they [were] talking about the telephones and the
chemicals, he looked like he was really interested in it more than
Nichols was."
Trial witnesses characterized Nichols's conduct as the
opposite of McVeigh's behavior; for Participant 25, these
differences individualized the defendants. Participants reported
that Nichols was more emotional than McVeigh, and also
credited Nichols with displaying more situationally appropriate
emotions; for example, Participant 8 stated that Nichols
appeared to be "uncomfortable, scared, guilty .... He looked very
frightened." For Participant 29, these displays of emotion were
signs of humanity: "And I hate to give him credit for this but you
kind of see a person in Nichols." Nichols was also described as
quieter and more somber.
Participants' impressions of McVeigh as a defiant,
remorseless defendant who took pride in the sophistication of his
crimes set the tone for the years between McVeigh's guilty
verdict and death sentence and his ultimate execution. It was
this period of time in which McVeigh was perceived to attempt to
manipulate victims' families through media contact, prompting
Attorney General John Ashcroft to plead with journalists not to
interview McVeigh shortly before the execution.21'
McVeigh's behavior at trial was a nail in his coffin; it is what
cemented family members' and survivors' initial impressions of
211. Dan Eggen & Lois Romano, Ashcroft Asks Media to Limit McVeigh's Exposure,
WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2001, at A4.
456 [46:2
HeinOnline -- 46 Hous. L. Rev. 456 2009-2010
WHEN ITS SO HARD TO RELATE
him as a defiant, remorseless, arrogant offender. Trial attendees
now felt they "knew" what sort of men McVeigh and Nichols
were. Moreover, McVeigh's behavior profoundly affected the
reception of his later remarks to the media, cultivating the
widespread perceptions that such remarks were made to
manipulate and further wound families and survivors. This
would ultimately produce a sense that McVeigh had to be
executed in order to silence him and thereby end the victim-
offender relationship-a justification that was never given in
efforts to impose the death penalty upon Nichols.
V. How LEGAL INSTITUTIONS CAN MITIGATE THE HARMFUL
EFFECTS OF VICTIM-OFFENDER RELATIONSHIPS
A. The Role of Victim Services in Mitigating Victim-Offender
Relationships
Given that victims are likely to feel negative, involuntary
ties to defendants in the aftermath of violent crime, what
responsibilities do legal institutions have to assist victims in
dealing with the consequences of these relationships?
This Article proposes that victim services agencies be
inserted into the breach to mitigate the negative effects of such
relations. Such agencies, most often housed in county
prosecutors' offices, already undertake the responsibilities of
interacting with victims and their family members in the
immediate aftermath of the crime and preparing them to attend
trial.212 Thus, these agencies would be in the best position to
provide education on the victim-offender relationships that are
likely to form in order to mitigate the negative effects of such
ties.
Moreover, the task of educating victims about victim-
offender relationships already fits within the pantheon of duties
fulfilled by victim services. The Office of Victims of Crime,
housed in the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs, states that communities should strive to provide
comprehensive victim services.21 This includes an astonishing
212. See, e.g., Harris County District Attorney's Office, Victims' Rights,
http://app.dao.hctx.net/victimwitness.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2009); New York County
District Attorney's Office, Witness Aid Services Unit-Counseling Department,
http://manhattanda.org/victimservices/counseling-dept.shtml (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
213. OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OVC BULLETIN-NEW
DIRECTIONS FROM THE FIELD: VICTIMS' RIGHTS AND SERVICES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 27
(1998), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/new/directions/pdftxt/bulletins/bltn7.pdf
[hereinafter OVC BULLETIN].
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diversity of tasks. Immediately following the crime, victim
services assistance can include crisis intervention, emergency
transportation, shelter, financial aid, counseling referrals,
restraining or protective orders, child care services, and crime
scene cleanup.214 In investigative stages, victim services is
charged with offering regular updates, notification of suspect
arrest, basic information on the criminal justice system,
notification of pretrial release, and input on release decisions.215
During the prosecutory phase, victim services personnel provide
an orientation to the criminal justice system, regular updates on
case status, accompaniment to court, safe waiting areas,
notification of plea negotiations and victim consultation in such
decisions, transportation, child care, and so on.216 At sentencing,
victim services employees notify victims and victims' family
members of the right to submit a victim impact statement,
coordinate the creation and delivery of these statements, and
gather victim opinions on sentencing.2 ' Following sentencing,
victim services inform victims and their family members of where
the defendant is in custody (as well as of escape and capture),
update them on the defendant's appeals, notify them of upcoming
parole hearings (victim services also coordinates victim impact
statements at parole hearings), alert them to violation or
revocation of parole or probation, inform them of applications for
clemency, pardon, or commutation, and report to them release or
execution dates.21 Throughout the entire process, victim services
is also charged with providing short and long-term counseling
and intervention with employers, creditors, landlords, and public
agencies.219 Descriptions of these duties are set forth in many
governmental publications.220
These lists of victim services duties do not define the outer
limit of its responsibilities. During the McVeigh trial, for
instance, a great deal of effort was invested in debriefing victims
in attendance about the day's legal proceedings after the court
recessed. An Attorney Liaison was utilized; this individual was a
member of the prosecution team and advocated for victims'
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 28.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 27.
220. See, e.g., OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY
GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS ASSISTANCE 23-36 (2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/final.pdf.
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interests.22' The Attorney Liaison "explained the relevance of
what had been heard and seen that day in court and what could
be anticipated for the next day of trial," including "attorney
decisions, judicial rulings, strictures on witness testimony, and
the sequence of trial events," and even warned family members
and survivors "about upcoming potentially painful testimony or
exhibits."222 As one publication on the provision of victim services
following the Oklahoma City bombing stressed, "[tihese
debriefings allowed individuals to prepare psychologically or to
choose not to attend the session."222 Significantly, "[t]hese
meetings generally concluded with a brief discussion of ways in
which the victims could take care of themselves emotionally,"
and counselors were present to assist if needed.224
Of all criminal justice personnel, victim services employees
work with victims and their families most intensely, most
frequently, and for the longest periods of time. Victim services is
also the entity responsible for promoting victim comprehension of
legal proceedings and providing counseling. Moreover, such
agencies are already charged with satisfying many of victims'
core post-conviction informational requirements-the need to
keep track of defendants, including developments in parole,
release, and execution.225 Thus, victim services workers are the
most qualified and in the best position to address the complicated
consequences of victim-offender relationships.
But victim services cannot adequately assist victims and
their families or effectively prepare them for trial without
educating them of the presence and potential consequences of
victim-offender relationships. Victim services employees must
not only be aware of the likelihood that such involuntary ties will
develop, but must also warn victims about such bonds in the
aftermath of the crime and work with victims to mitigate the
negative effects of any relations that are perceived to form at a
later time. These efforts could include brochures or educational
videos that describe the victim-offender relationship and its
consequences and provide additional information on how such a
relationship forms and progresses. For instance, such educational
materials could contextualize defendants' potential demeanor at
trial by warning victims that defendants may strive to appear
stoic on the advice of defense counsel or for cultural reasons.
221. RESPONDING TO TERRORISM VICTIMS, supra note 3, at 17.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. OVC BULLETIN, supra note 213, at 28.
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Significantly, educating victims and their families on the
negative effects of victim-offender relationships also fits into the
trauma model that many agencies have espoused since the
President's Task Force on Victims of Crime concluded that the
criminal justice system's treatment of crime victims was a
national disgrace and specifically noted that violent crime
produced psychological and physical injuries.2 '6 The involuntary
victim-offender relationship, which also is intertwined with
victims' perceived needs to uncover as much information as
possible about the crime and offender, to understand the crime,
and to ensure that the offender is held accountable, helps to
create and prolong the trauma when answers are not
forthcoming or when the defendant is resistant or unremorseful
or receives a sentence that victims believe is too lenient. Advising
victims and their families on how to evaluate defendants' conduct
and on how to cope with these perceived involuntary ties is an
essential part of responding to post-victimization trauma.
Significantly, the likelihood that victims will be further wounded
by such involuntary bonds underscores how crucial it is for victim
services workers to share as much information about the crime
as possible with victims and to keep them informed of new case
developments.
Moreover, incorporating such reforms into victim services'
duties is in no way burdensome. Victim services agencies have
already been in operation for several years or even for decades,
and so incorporating such efforts could assist victims a great deal
at no expense to states beyond that needed to develop and
distribute educational materials. In addition, the provision of
victim services is already oriented towards reducing post-
victimization trauma. Victim services personnel are currently
trained to improve victims' levels of social support and the degree
and nature of their exposure to the criminal justice system, both
of which play important roles in recovery from crime-related
psychological trauma.227  Victim advocates are trained to
226. See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT, at vii, 2-13
(1982) (describing a fictional account of a violent crime from the victim's point of view and
detailing the inadequacies of the criminal justice system in servicing the victim). For
scholarship on the role that trauma plays in victimization, see Jan H. Kamphuis & Paul
M.G. Emmelkamp, Crime-Related Trauma: Psychological Distress in Victims of
Bankrobbery, 12 J. ANXIETY DISORDERS 199 (1998); Jan H. Kamphuis & Paul M.G.
Emmelkamp, Traumatic Distress Among Support-Seeking Female Victims of Stalking,
158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 795 (2001); Dean G. Kilpatrick et al., Victim and Crime Factors
Associated with the Development of Crime-Related Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 20
BEHAVIOUR THERAPY 199, 199-214 (1989).
227. For a discussion of the impact a victim's participation in the criminal justice
system has on his recovery, see Deborah Kelly, Victim Participation in the Criminal
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encourage victims and their family members to maintain or
establish positive social bonds by taking advantage of preexisting
relationships with family and friends and by meeting others in
similar situations, thereby building social support networks.
Helping victims to enhance social support networks is important
because victims with little social support are more likely to need
professional counseling."8  In addition, a positive victim
experience with the criminal justice system "is largely dependent
upon comprehensive, sensitive and inclusive treatment of victims
by criminal justice personnel."229 Victim services employees are
instructed that they must recognize that, "by virtue of their
association with the trauma and the perpetrator, they will often
become 'triggers' for negative emotions and distress in crime
victims," and that "steps must be taken to counter the effects of
these associations so that victims might view criminal justice
system proceedings and staff as supportive and worthwhile."23 If
victim services employees must work to break victims' perceived
associations between victim services and offenders, then it is
even more crucial that they endeavor to properly contextualize
perceived involuntary bonds between victims or their family
members and offenders. The consequences of such effective
mitigation include reduced traumatization and healthier victims
who may be more willing to participate as effective prosecution
witnesses.23'
B. The Importance of Offering Victim-Offender Mediation
Post-adjudication mediation offers victims and their family
members the opportunity to replace the involuntary, negative
para-social ties that characterize the victim-offender relationship
with voluntary and likely more positive interpersonal dialogue.
Critically, this dialogue allows victims to exercise much more
control over subject matter than adversarial legal proceedings
focused on questions of guilt or innocence, and takes place post-
conviction, when victims are more likely to listen to an offender
who has been held accountable and less likely to discredit
Justice System, in 25 VICTIMS OF CRIME: PROBLEMS, POLICIES & PROGRAMS 172, 182
(Arthur J. Lurigio et al. eds., 1990).
228. TRAUMATIC STRESS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 150-51 (John R. Freedy &
Stevan E. Hobfoll eds., 1995).
229. OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL VICTIM
ASSISTANCE ACADEMY TEXTBOOK ch. 6 (2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/
assist/nvaa2002/chapter6-l.html.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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expressions of remorse as self-serving. Productive interaction is
much more likely to occur after parties establish temporal and
emotional distance from adversarial legal proceedings, and after
both parties can be prepared for the mediation. Moreover, it is
essential to offer parties the chance to meet in a safe space that
is free of the institutional and procedural constraints of the
courtroom. Mediation may also supplement adjudication, since
an opportunity to meet with the offender may be necessary for a
victim to feel that he has truly been held accountable for his
actions. Some victims' perceptions of accountability, for instance,
may include the need to inform the offender of the horrific impact
that the crime has had on their lives. Ultimately, victim-offender
mediation allows victims to move far beyond the one-sided
para-social relationship that likely formed through media
coverage and legal proceedings; they, not reporters or attorneys,
get to ask questions beyond the threshold matters of guilt or
innocence. Without such an opportunity, the negative effects of
the involuntary victim-offender relationship will at best persist
for much longer than they otherwise would; at worst, these
traumatic effects may never be effectively resolved.
Victim-offender mediation embodies restorative justice
principles and is therefore designed to increase the likelihood
that victims and communities will heal from the wounds inflicted
by criminal offenders. Restorative justice values see the victim as
"central to the criminal justice process," and support the victim
through increased participation and services.232 In addition, its
tenets require that offenders be held directly accountable to the
person or the community that they victimized.233 As of 2004,
twenty-nine states offered victim-offender mediation; twenty-
three states had a statutory scheme for mediation in place; and
six had victim-offender mediation-type programs.234 Nine states
allowed victim-offender mediation for felonies, but only Texas
offered it for murder.23 The vast majority of states either
restricted victim-offender mediation to nonviolent offenses236 or
232. Elizabeth Lightfoot & Mark Umbreit, An Analysis of State Statutory Provisions
for Victim-Offender Mediation, 15 CRIM. JUST. POLY REV. 418, 419-20 (2004).
233. Id. at 419.
234. Id. at 420.
235. Delaware, Iowa, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin allow victim-offender
mediation for felonies and aggravated misdemeanors; Oklahoma, Minnesota, and Ohio
permit it for felonies but restrict it in cases involving the death penalty, life
imprisonment, or mandatory prison sentences, respectively; and North Carolina
determines whether victim-offender mediation is appropriate based on a formula
weighing the seriousness of the crime and criminal history. Id. at 433.
236. Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Alabama, Alaska, Florida, Kansas, and Montana
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did not specify in what cases victim-offender mediation was
available, or left the matter entirely to authorities' discretion.
Because negative, involuntary ties between the victim and
offender are more likely to form and to be most intense in the
aftermath of violent crimes, it is crucial that victim-offender
mediation be implemented or extended to reach the victims of
these most serious offenses.
There is, of course, a link between victim services and
victim-offender mediation. In addition to educating victims about
the negative repercussions of involuntary ties to offenders, victim
services in states that provide for victim-offender mediation
must inform victims that such opportunities are available and, if
victims are interested in taking advantage of them, should help
them to pursue this objective.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the Oklahoma City context, victims' families and
survivors perceived that they were fettered to McVeigh by
involuntary ties rooted in media coverage of the bomber and
reinforced by his courtroom conduct. These bonds so pervaded
family members' and survivors' lives that they felt trussed not
only to McVeigh but also to the bombing. These ties also sapped
the recuperative energies of family members and survivors,
distracting them from processes of social, emotional, and
psychological renewal as well as from other life activities. Those
who attended McVeigh's trial to learn more about the man and
the crime were obsessed with scrutinizing his conduct throughout
the proceedings and were haunted by McVeigh's inappropriately
unemotional, arrogant, and jocular conduct for years afterwards.
For many, these involuntary relations were so unrelenting that
they ceased only after his execution. Attesting to the constancy of
these bonds, several participants stated that McVeigh's execution
finally "silenced" him, intimating that he was killed not only in
return for his role in the bombing but also because he was
invariably a communicative presence in the lives of family
members and survivors. Educating victims of the normality of
these involuntary ties and their negative effects would have been
an important step in helping victims to cope with them, and may
have decreased family members' and survivors' preoccupation
only allow victim-offender mediation for nonviolent crimes. Id.
237. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine,
Missouri, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington either do not specify for what crimes
victim-offender mediation may be utilized, or they leave it to authorities' discretion. Id.
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with McVeigh and his behavior before and during his trial,
thereby preventing proceedings from simply being another venue
in which McVeigh traumatized these individuals.
Victim services and victim-offender mediation programs
stand on the front lines and represent the best means of
informing victims of violent crime and their family members of
the likely formation of involuntary victim-offender relationships
as well as for advising them on coping strategies. If a victim-
offender relationship develops and persists, a preoccupation with
the offender and his behavior will likely taint every stage in legal
proceedings, distracting victims and decreasing the likelihood
that they will be able to derive other more healing benefits from
such events. In recent years, legal institutions have recognized
what is at stake for victims in criminal prosecutions and opened
many doors to allow them greater access to and participation in
legal proceedings. Federal, state, and local governments have
implemented programs such as victim services to assist victims
in walking through these open doors of opportunity, crossing the
threshold to greater involvement. Crucially, it is now time for
legal institutions to take the next step: determining how existing
victim services and other programs should be enhanced by
conducting additional research on involuntary victim-offender
relationships and designing and implementing appropriate
interventions based on research findings. Otherwise, greater
victim entree could lead to greater victim traumatization.
Without such developments, victims will continue to be
disturbed by these involuntary ties to the offender, an
unfortunate outcome that is doubly tragic because it is
preventable. It would be strange indeed to not only leave in place
a key stumbling block that continues to trip victims as they try to
take advantage of increased access and involvement, but also to
stand unmoved as victim after victim continues to fumble. For it
is not victims who are clumsy, but the systems that have been
put into place to safeguard their interests.
APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY
The research conclusions in this Article are based on twenty-
seven in-depth, face-to-face, open-ended interviews the Author
conducted with individuals who were either victims' family
members or survivors of the Oklahoma City bombing. An open
interviewing technique permitted the interviewer to
conversationally guide participants through accounts of how the
bombing, trials, and McVeigh's execution affected their lives
while granting participants complete freedom of response and
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allowing the flexibility to ask follow-up questions. Interviews
were conducted at any site in Oklahoma City that was
comfortable for the participant, and most were conducted in
participants' residences. Three interviews with participants who
did not reside in Oklahoma were conducted via telephone. All
interviews were recorded with participants' permission and
transcribed for analysis. Research participants were recruited
through two methods. First, letters were mailed anonymously238
to individuals on the mailing list of the Murrah Federal Building
Survivors Association; these letters described the research
project and requested that interested individual contact the
Author directly to participate. Second, other prospective research
participants were contacted by individuals who had already been
interviewed; these participants in turn contacted the Author
directly to schedule interviews. The final participant sample was
composed of seventeen females and ten males. Of the twenty-
seven participants, twenty-six were Caucasian and one was
African-American. This demographic composition parallels both
the overwhelmingly white membership of the post-bombing
groups, including the Murrah Building Survivor's Association,
and that of the larger victim population. All participants were
over eighteen years of age (participants' ages ranged from mid-
thirties to early seventies) and thus were able to legally consent
to participation. The Author maintains the transcript of each
interview on file. Because this project was exploratory and no a
priori theory existed to guide the Author's inquiry, a grounded
theory methodology239 was adopted from the inception of this
project.
238. Contact letters and postage were provided to an officer of the Murrah Federal
Building Survivor's Association, who then addressed and mailed the letters to association
members.
239. Grounded theory research involves developing theory inductively from data; one
reads a set of data and categorizes it into themes through a process of open-coding, and
then relates the codes to one another to decipher their interrelationships. See BARNEY G.
GLASER & ANSELM L. STRAUSS, THE DISCOVERY OF GROUNDED THEORY: STRATEGIES FOR
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 1 (1967) ("[Tlhe discovery of theory from data-which we call
grounded theory-is a major task confronting sociology today."); ANSELM STRAUSS &
JULIET CORBIN, BASICS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: GROUNDED THEORY PROCEDURES AND
TECHNIQUES 23 (1990) (defining grounded theory).
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